Afleveringen
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In Federalist Paper No. 25, Alexander Hamilton continues to make the case for a strong national defense, emphasizing the drawbacks of relying solely on state militias. Hamilton argues that state militias are generally ill-equipped and lack the discipline to effectively defend the nation against foreign threats. He suggests that a standing federal army, operating under the guidance of a centralized government, is essential for national security. By doing so, Hamilton seeks to debunk the idea that state militias could replace a federal military force, stressing that such an approach would weaken the United States in the face of external threats.
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Federalist Paper No. 24, authored by Alexander Hamilton, continues the discussion on the need for a robust centralized authority, this time focusing on the necessity of maintaining a standing army. Hamilton argues that local militias alone are insufficient for national defense. He addresses concerns that a standing army might be used for tyrannical purposes, contending that a well-regulated force under civilian control poses no such threat. The paper seeks to assuage fears about potential military despotism, making the case that a standing army is essential for the protection of the young nation, particularly against external threats.
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Federalist Paper No. 23, written by Alexander Hamilton, addresses the necessity of a strong central government in matters of national defense and security. Hamilton argues that the federal government must be empowered to handle all aspects of national defense, without any significant limitations. He outlines the unpredictability and diversity of threats that a nation could face, such as war, domestic insurrection, and interactions with foreign powers. According to Hamilton, these circumstances are so varied and unforeseeable that setting rigid restrictions on the federal government's ability to act would be imprudent. In essence, the paper makes the case for granting expansive powers to the national government in the realm of national security, contending that limited authority would inadequately protect the nation from external and internal threats.
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Federalist No. 22, authored by Alexander Hamilton, further critiques the limitations of the Articles of Confederation while advocating for the new U.S. Constitution. This paper specifically focuses on several key issues: the inefficiency of a government that requires unanimity for decision-making, the dangers of a weak central authority in matters of foreign policy and defense, and the inefficacy of the Articles in regulating interstate commerce.Hamilton starts by dissecting the requirement for unanimous consent in the confederation for making amendments and important decisions. He argues that requiring unanimity is impractical and essentially leads to a governance paralysis. It gives undue power to a minority, allowing even a single dissenting state to block beneficial laws or amendments.On the subject of foreign policy and defense, Hamilton posits that a weak central government cannot effectively negotiate with foreign powers or maintain a national defense. Without a strong federal authority, states might pursue their own foreign policies, leading to disunity and potentially putting the nation at risk.Another major issue Hamilton addresses is the regulation of interstate commerce. Under the Articles, individual states can impose tariffs and obstruct trade, leading to a complex and inefficient economic landscape. Hamilton argues that a federal system with the power to regulate commerce among the states would lead to a more vibrant and unified national economy.In conclusion, Federalist No. 22 serves as a detailed critique of the failures of the Articles of Confederation, particularly in terms of governance, foreign policy, and economic regulation. Hamilton uses these failures to make a compelling case for the new U.S. Constitution, which aims to address these shortcomings through a stronger, more centralized system of government. This essay adds to the cumulative argument for the necessity of a robust federal system as proposed in the Constitution.
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Federalist No. 21, authored by Alexander Hamilton, focuses on the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation with respect to the central government's ability to raise revenue, maintain internal order, and enforce laws. The paper serves as a critique of the existing system, laying the groundwork for the arguments in favor of the new U.S. Constitution.One of the key points Hamilton makes is about the inefficacy of the existing system of taxation under the Articles. He argues that the federal government's reliance on requisitions from states is unreliable and ineffective. States often fail to meet their obligations, leading to financial instability at the federal level. Hamilton contends that the new Constitution would remedy this by granting the federal government the authority to levy taxes directly on individuals, thereby ensuring a consistent and reliable source of revenue.Hamilton also addresses the issue of internal order, criticizing the inability of the Articles to maintain peace and stability within the states. He suggests that a stronger central government would be better equipped to handle internal discord, including insurrections and rebellions.Additionally, the paper talks about the absence of a unified system for enforcing laws. Under the Articles, enforcement is left to individual states, leading to inconsistent and often ineffectual implementation. Hamilton argues that the proposed Constitution would solve this problem by creating a federal judiciary and executive with the power to enforce laws uniformly across all states.In summary, Federalist No. 21 serves as an incisive critique of the Articles of Confederation, highlighting their failures in financial, legal, and internal governance. Hamilton uses these criticisms to build the case for the new U.S. Constitution, which he argues would provide a more effective and equitable system of governance. The paper thus emphasizes the need for a stronger central authority capable of addressing the nation's financial, legal, and social challenges.
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Federalist No. 20, penned by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, continues the examination of confederate systems of government, which was initiated in Federalist No. 15. This paper focuses particularly on the example of the United Netherlands, a confederation that, while appearing to be effective on the surface, is revealed to have significant flaws upon closer examination.The Dutch Confederacy is described as complex, consisting of several sovereign states bound together under a federal structure. Despite this intricate framework, the authors point out that the central government has little real authority over individual provinces. Instead, most power resides with the states, leading to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. The Dutch model requires unanimity for federal decisions, which makes the process cumbersome and often leads to inaction or compromise solutions that satisfy no one.Hamilton and Madison highlight the shortcomings of a government system in which the federal government lacks direct authority over the people and has to work through state governments. They argue that the United Netherlands serves as a cautionary example of how such confederate systems can be paralyzed by their own complexity and structural weaknesses.The paper concludes by reinforcing the argument for a strong, centralized American government as proposed in the new U.S. Constitution. Hamilton and Madison assert that the proposed federal structure would address many of the weaknesses inherent in confederate systems by creating a strong central authority capable of direct action and equipped with the necessary checks and balances to maintain liberty and justice.In essence, Federalist No. 20 serves as another persuasive argument for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, emphasizing the need for a robust federal system to avoid the pitfalls that have plagued historical confederacies like the United Netherlands.
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Federalist No. 19 delves into the challenges and inefficiencies associated with confederate governments, using historical examples to demonstrate the need for a stronger centralized authority in the United States.Authors Hamilton and Madison start by exploring ancient confederacies, such as the Amphictyonic League in ancient Greece and the Achaean League. These alliances were fragile and often unable to secure compliance from their member states, leading to weak enforcement of rules and regulations. They were also ineffective in defending against external threats or maintaining internal stability.Hamilton and Madison then turn their attention to feudal Europe, specifically the Holy Roman Empire, which they describe as a complex, overlapping system of jurisdictions and sovereignties that resulted in a weak and ineffective central authority. They point out that the Empire was often more a collection of individual entities rather than a unified nation, thereby suffering from inefficiencies, infighting, and an inability to enact or enforce coherent policies.In particular, the authors note that in such confederacies, the primary power is vested in the individual member states rather than the central authority. This imbalance creates a host of problems: the lack of a strong central military force, the inability to enact uniform laws or collect taxes efficiently, and the absence of a unified foreign policy, to name a few.One of the key points made is that these confederate systems often had to rely on force or coercion to get member states to comply with laws or policies, which is not only inefficient but also counterproductive. These historical examples are meant to serve as cautionary tales.Hamilton and Madison argue that the United States, under the Articles of Confederation, showed symptoms of these same problems. They advocate for a stronger centralized government, as outlined in the proposed Constitution, to avoid these pitfalls. Unlike the weak confederacies of the past, a robust federal system would have a balance of power and checks that ensure both effectiveness and fairness.The essay thus concludes by positioning the U.S. Constitution as the solution to the historical failures of confederate governments. By highlighting these failures, Federalist No. 19 aims to persuade its readers of the necessity of a strong centralized authority for the newly emerging American nation.
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In this paper, Madison continues to outline the inadequacies of the Articles of Consideration. His core concern in this paper is to establish the fundamental weaknesses inherent in a system of government composed of multiple sovereigns under a relatively powerless central government.Madison uses the example of the ancient Greek republics under the Amphyctionic council as historical evidence for why the Articles of Confederation would ultimately lead to disaster in America. He begins by showing that the system of government in this confederation seems to provide the central, governing council with all the powers it would need to keep the confederation strong and prosperous. However, it has a fatal flaw: each republic in the confederation “retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal council.” Without an unquestioned higher authority to keep all the constituent republics in check, the council was soon torn apart by various divisions as the more powerful members sought to intimidate and exploit the weaker ones. Ultimately the republics, unable to maintain their unity, fell under the control of foreign powers.Madison also invokes the example of the Achaean League and suggests that the general authority and laws of the confederacy were able to temper the disorders within the members of the league. By giving up their sovereignty to the confederation, the members of this league experienced fewer disturbances and divisions. The downfall of the league only came when the Achaeans practiced “arts of division” and allowed their union to be dissolved.
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Hamilton seeks to address concerns that the proposed Constitution will lead to tyranny at the hands of a power-hungry national government. He argues that it is unlikely that men in national office would even be interested in usurping the powers from the states, which relate to concerns that “can never be desirable cares” of a general government.However, Hamilton argues that even if the national government were to try and usurp power from the states, it would be very difficult for it to do so. He contends that state governments will likely have far more influence over and support from the people then the national government. Essentially, Hamilton is arguing that since states deal with issues that more directly impact the day-to-day lives of the people, especially criminal and civil justice issues, they are more likely to inspire feelings of attachment from the people than a distant, national government would.As evidence, Hamilton points to European feudal societies and notes that it was very difficult for the sovereign to control his feudal baronies. Hamilton asserts that state governments in the American confederacy are analogous to these feudal baronies in that both are able to effectively resist central control. If anything, Hamilton warns, Americans should be concerned about a federal system leading to anarchy, not tyranny.
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Federalist 16, Alexander Hamilton the New York Packet: December 4, 1787.
Hamilton begins this essay by restating that it is an absolute fact that the present confederation, because of the manner in which it has been set up, is the "parent of anarchy," and that the delinquencies of the states of the Union are the "natural offspring" that will lead the country to civil war. From this point, Hamilton proceeds to hypothetically go through the consequences of a lack of a large, standing, national army. In Hamilton's opinion, the end would be a war between the states because the strongest state is likely to prevail in any disagreement with no national army to put the states in their proper place. This would be the violent death of the confederacy. The other alternative would the "natural death" - what Hamilton thought the country was in the midst of at the writing of the Federalist Papers. If there is not war between the sates, the states would simply do their own bidding, disregarding the federal government, and the federal government's power would erode until it was completely eradicated.At this point, Hamilton reminds his reader that the country should prefer a national constitution, and one that has provisions for a large army, "continuously on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government." While some of the critics of the constitution want to believe that there is an alternative, anything else is impractical. From this argument for a standing army, Hamilton proceeds to discuss the necessity of not governing merely the states, but of the government having power over the individual. The government must "carry its agency to the persons of the citizens." Hamilton proceeds to argue that the individual state legislatures should not have to approve the laws because they could disregard the laws, and their disregard would ruin the system of law in the country. Unity of the country is paramount, and the only way unity can occur is through a strong, national government. Alexander Hamilton concludes his essay by claiming that no government can always avoid or control those who will be disorderly, but it would be "vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because it could not perform impossibilities." -
Hamilton begins by telling the people that in the previous papers he has tried to convince them of the importance of the Union to "political safety and happiness." In this essay, he changes the theme to the "insufficiency of the present confederation to the preservation of the union." He argues that the majority of the people agree that the present form of government will eventually lead to "impending anarchy." He continues that the United States has reached the "last stage of national humiliation," because of large debts, territories in the possession of a foreign power, a lack of military, a lack of money, inability to navigate on the Mississippi River, lack of commerce, lack of respect by foreign powers, decrease in value of property, and unavailability of credit. In sum, because of "national disorder, poverty, and insignificance." Hamilton urges that the country must firmly stand for safety, tranquility, dignity, and reputation. He attacks the supporters of the Articles of Confederation, claiming that though they admit that the government is destitute of energy, they stand against "conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy," wanting instead, something that is impossible, the augmentation of federal powers without decreasing the powers of the states. To Hamilton, the biggest problem in the existing government is the principle of legislation for states in a collective manner, which creates multiple sovereigns. Under this situation, the laws of the nation, though constitutionally binding, become merely suggestions that the states can choose to follow or not follow. While he sees nothing wrong with compacts between states, like such treaties that exist throughout the world, from experience he believes that little dependence can be placed on such agreements. He believes that the states of the country could stand in similar relation to each other, and it would not be ideal but would be "consistent and practicable." But if there is still some desire for a national government, it must take on different characteristics from a league of governments: we must extend "the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens, the only proper objects of government." The very idea of a government implies the power of making laws and those laws must contain a consequence, a penalty, applied by the military or the court. Because no system exists under the Articles of Confederation that properly carries out the law (no national court system), the government is useless. For Hamilton, government was created because the passions of men do not conform to the "dictates of reason and justice" and groups of men act with greater intelligence than individuals alone. Hamilton supposes that this is because reputation has a less active influence. In addition, he believes that because of the nature of sovereign power, people become obsessed with their own power. A meeting of many sovereign powers, then, like the Articles of Confederation, creates problems because a love of power means that people fail to compromise. The business of the government, therefore, cannot be carried out under this system and national interests become subservient to individual desires and wishes. Alexander Hamilton, finally, specifically attacks the Articles of Confederation as failing because the system was destined to fail. It did not happen all at once, but instead, gradually, progressing to the point that things have become a "stand-all," with everyone "yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest and convenience, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads and to crush us beneath its ruins."
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In this paper, Madison seeks to counter the arguments made by opponents of the Constitution that America is too large a country to be governed as a united republic. He argues that these critics, in arguing that a republic must be confined to a small territory, have confused a republic with a democracy. The difference, according to Madison, is that in a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in person, whereas in a republic the people govern the country through their elected representatives. Because a republic has representatives, it can extend over a large region. Madison calculates in some detail the size of the United States and argues that it is not too large to be governed by a republic, especially when compared to Great Britain and other European countries.
Madison argues further that the general government will only be authorized to deal with issues of concern to the entire republic. State governments will be left to deal with local concerns, thus making the administration of a country as vast as the US more manageable. Furthermore, as America becomes more developed with roads, canals and other infrastructure, it will be easier for the states to communicate and thus easier for the national government to administer the country. Finally, although representatives from those states farthest from the capitol (such as Georgia) will have longer to travel, they will also be in greater need of the benefits of union due to the dangers inherent in being a frontier.
Madison concludes this paper by exhorting Americans not to destroy their unity. He dismisses those who say no country has ever succeeded in what Americans are trying to accomplish, and encourages Americans to boldly accomplish what has not been accomplished before. -
IN THIS SHORT PAPER, HAMILTON ARGUES THAT A UNION WILL BE MORE COST EFFECTIVE THAN A SYSTEM OF MULTIPLE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTIES. IF AMERICA WERE TO BE DIVIDED INTO THIRTEEN INDEPENDENT STATES, OR SOME SMALLER NUMBER OF CONFEDERACIES, EACH POLITY WOULD HAVE TO EMPLOY ITS OWN “CIVIL LIST,” OR BUREAUCRACY, TO MANAGE PUBLIC AFFAIRS. EACH STATE WOULD FURTHERMORE HAVE TO EMPLOY PEOPLE TO GUARD ITS BORDERS AGAINST ILLICIT TRADE AND AN ARMY TO DEFEND AGAINST INVASION. ALL THESE EXPENSES WOULD PROVE TO BE A SIGNIFICANT AND UNNECESSARY BURDEN TO EACH SOVEREIGNTY’S ECONOMY.
IN CONTRAST, UNITED AMERICA WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE DO WITH A SINGLE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, A SINGLE ARMY, AND A SINGLE ENTITY RESPONSIBLE FOR CATCHING SMUGGLERS. THIS WOULD REDUCE WASTE AND INEFFICIENCY. HAMILTON POINTS TO THE EXAMPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN’S GOVERNMENT TO ARGUE THAT A SINGLE, WELL-STRUCTURED, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT COULD EASILY BE EXTENDED TO COVER LARGE SWATHS OF TERRITORY AND BIG POPULATIONS. -
In this paper, Hamilton continues his defense of the union provided for by the Constitution by arguing that a single national government will be better able to collect taxes than individual, disunited states. He bases his argument on the assertions that a steady source of revenue is essential to the strength of any nation and that taxes on commerce and consumption are more desirable then direct taxes on individuals based on what they produce. He contends that if America were divided into multiple states or confederacies, it would be very easy for smugglers to bypass the commercial taxes put in place by the various states.
He uses the example of France’s difficulty in patrolling its large land border with neighboring European countries and contends that smugglers could use the many land borders between the states to avoid tax collectors. For example, if New York had higher taxes than New Jersey, an English merchant could bring his goods to a New Jersey port, smuggle them across the border to New York and thus avoid the higher New York taxes. If, however, America were united as a single country, it would only need to patrol its Atlantic sea border and would thus be able to better secure taxes from foreign trade. Hamilton warns that if America is disunited then commercial taxes will soon prove insufficient, forcing the states to levy oppressive taxes on land owners. -
In this paper, Alexander Hamilton continues the defense of union over disunion by outlining the benefits of the former for American commerce and naval power. He argues that in order for Americans to maintain an active commerce, by which he means the ability to control and shape the terms of its trade with foreign powers, America requires a union. He argues that only a union will be strong enough to secure favorable terms of trade with European powers.
He contends further that a united America will be able to pool its diverse resources in building a powerful navy. This navy would then help deter European powers from threatening American commercial interests and stealing American resources. It would furthermore give America significant influence in shaping the international politics of the West Indies where the European powers have significant commercial interests. Hamilton warns that were America to find itself in a state of disunion, the individual states would be too weak to resist the predatory behavior of European powers who would be able to impose unfair terms of trade on the Americans. America would ultimately be reduced to what Hamilton calls a “passive commerce,” which would enrich foreign powers at the expense of American merchants. -
FEDERALIST 10 (AUTHORED BY MADISON WRITING AS PUBLIUS) CLAIMS THAT THE “VIOLENCE OF FACTION” IS THE “MORTAL DISEASE” OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS. EVEN TODAY, HE SAYS, POINTING TO THE EXPERIENCE OF THE STATES, THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN RIVAL PARTIES TOO OFTEN LEAD NOT TO REASONABLE COMPROMISES BUT TO DECISIONS MADE “NOT ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF JUSTICE, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE MINOR PARTY, BUT BY THE SUPERIOR FORCE OF AN INTERESTED AND OVERBEARING MAJORITY.” UNLESS IT REMEDIES THIS PROBLEM ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL, THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL NOT CEMENT “A WELL CONSTRUCTED UNION” OF THE STATES.
WE CAN CURE THE DISEASE OF FACTION EITHER BY “REMOVING ITS CAUSES” OR BY “CONTROLLING ITS EFFECTS.” THERE ARE BUT TWO WAYS TO REMOVE THE CAUSES OF FACTION: TO DESTROY “THE LIBERTY ESSENTIAL TO ITS EXISTENCE,” OR TO GIVE “TO EVERY CITIZEN THE SAME OPINIONS, THE SAME PASSIONS, AND THE SAME INTERESTS.” SINCE, IN OTHER WORDS, THE CAUSES OF FACTION ARE “SOWN IN THE NATURE OF MAN,” WE MUST DESIGN POPULAR GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL ITS EFFECTS.
FORTUNATELY, PUBLIUS POINTS OUT, AMONG THE VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR POPULAR GOVERNMENT — A PURE DEMOCRACY, A SMALL REPUBLIC, OR A LARGE REPUBLIC — THE CONSTITUTION IS DESIGNED NOT ONLY FOR THE ACTUAL AMERICAN SITUATION BUT ALSO FOR THAT MOST LIKELY TO MITIGATE THE PROBLEM OF FACTION. IT IS DESIGNED FOR A LARGE REPUBLIC EXTENDING OVER A GEOGRAPHICALLY LARGE AND DIVERSE TERRITORY AND COMPREHENDING WITHIN ITS LIMITS A DIVERSE AND CONSTANTLY SHIFTING AND RECONFIGURING ARRAY OF INTEREST GROUPS. THIS VERY DIVERSITY WILL PREVENT ANY SINGLE FACTION FROM ACQUIRING THE POWER TO TYRANNIZE OVER THE OTHERS. - Laat meer zien
