Afleveringen
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What is the military recruitment dilemma?
Military recruitment is problematic. And a key issue is that people who get paid good money can't solve it. So after six months of analysing YouTube, Facebook, Linkedin, X, Instagram, and yes, even TikTok comments - perhaps I can. The military recruitment ideas below are not meant to be taken in isolation, and most, if not all of them can be done together.
If any Members of Parliament or the General Staff are reading this, please feel free to help yourselves, I know that your idea buckets must be completely barren now.
1. The Infant-Infantry
Very few militaries on the planet consider children to be the solution to their needs, but very few countries are mentally agile or brave enough to survive the modern world. The British military, however, knows that an SA80 in the hands of a 14-year-old Glaswegian is just as deadly as an AK-47 in the hands of any rascally Russian Vatnik.
From the trenches of Ypres, the decks of the imperial navies, the streets of Kampala and the Killing Fields of Cambodia - children have been an effective part of militaries. Some as young as nine have proven that they can carry ammunition, fit into tunnel systems and the mechanisms of aircraft, artillery and tanks, and in a pinch, they can step into any SO1 role with relative ease.
Because the minimum wage is so low for younger people, this could also be a very cost-effective measure. The UK could easily raise a battalion of these "ten-pound Privates" for about half the cost of a regular one. This solution is also popular with many overworked teachers, who pity those kids clogging up overcrowded classrooms and enduring worthless education. Their hearts desire Call of Duty, Fortnite, the open sea, sky, and glory in battle - not GCSEs!
2. The British Commonwealth Legion
The Enlistment of Foreigners Act 1854 gave the country the power it needed before, and by Jove, Parliament can honour us again. Whilst the concept may be a copy of the French Foreign Legion, just like the class system of the Normans, if it's good enough for the French, it's good enough for us.
The UK already has a long history of Commonwealth and Sepoy armies, and we used international units before to great effect (e.g. No.10 (Inter-Allied) Commando unit in WWII). This system will yield significant numbers, and such great savings, that it can't be passed up. Anyone who's served on Herrick operations knows we could've solved the whole thing in a year for a tenth of the price if only we had a Corps of Gurkhas.
Commonwealth soldiers have been fantastic, but we should open their opportunity to the whole world. Fitness and aptitude assessments, as well as English literacy testing, will be done overseas, and successful applicants will be given a one-way plane ticket and a space in basic training, after which they will fill one of the many empty bedspaces found all over the forces.
They will serve a four-year minimum contract, then with one or two lucky family members (we'll work out the details later) they'll have earned their place in the country. They can continue to serve in the forces or head into the green and pleasant land as a full UK citizen and resident.
3. National Service+
This one is a favourite of the older generation, and for good reason. Wimpy young adults won't be making cringe videos on TikTok when they are getting thrashed up and down Mt Tumbledown and sweeping pinecones outside the Commanding Officer's office.
Youths fighting outside Argos in Kilburn should be fighting international terrorists or the Americans outside the chow hall in Camp Lemonnier! And if they like choreographed dance instead, what better place than as the rear marker on the parade square of Horse Guards?
There won't be a piece of brass unpolished as everyone between the ranks of Corporal and Warrant Officer Class 2 is given a five-person work party, and every Officer rank is issued a batsman and a personal assistant. Watch as productivity doubles, triples, and quadr...
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There are not more than five primary colors…
yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.
~ Sun Tzu
With the first week of April 2024 being Autism Acceptance Week, this article aims to highlight the presence of autistic soldiers in the army and the benefits of-and challenges in-embracing neuroinclusivity.
There was a whopping 787% rise1 in the number of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) diagnoses in the UK between 1998 and 2018. The condition itself is not on the rise. It is, instead, increasingly understood, recognised, and then diagnosed. A key contributor to identifying autism is that every one of the 570,000 educators2 across the 29,000 schools in the country have been asked to take on a mindset that all teachers are a teacher of Special Educational Needs and Disability (SEND).3
Because of the wholesale uptick of knowledge around autism, an awakening has been unfolding. A highly common theme begins as a parent's quest to understand their child's atypical behaviours soon reveals a startling revelation: many of these parents share a unique bond with said child. Prompted by the child's seemingly inexplicable behaviours in their early years, and flagged by attentive educators, families embark on an exploration of the condition and onto a seismic path of self-discovery.
This sheds light on thousands of individuals who had long-grappled with unexplained nuances in their own lives; huge numbers4 of UK adults are realising that they, too, are autistic.
Evolving diagnostic criteria, increased awareness, and improved access to diagnostic services have resulted in a late-diagnosis phenomenon and a sweeping tide of awareness cascading across the country, and indeed around the world. As individuals grapple with this newfound understanding, society is witnessing a profound shift in perception, empathy, and solidarity among people navigating the complexities of being neurodivergent.
Soldiers on the Spectrum
While this article focuses specifically on autism for Autism Acceptance Week, there are a plethora of other conditions placing neurominorities among our ranks.5
The next time your Unit is on a CO's parade, three ranks in a hollow square, look left and right. It is likely that you will be stood amongst neurominorities, and a small number of those will be diagnosed or undiagnosed autistic soldiers. Autistic soldiers are serving throughout the organisation and scattered across the ranks. I know this because I am one.
A request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 also shows us that, as at February 2023, over four hundred MOD personnel were autistic.6 And since researchers estimate that there are more undiagnosed autistic people in the UK than there are diagnosed,7 it goes then that there are many serving soldiers out there grappling with the condition unbeknownst to them. I write with much conviction: the number of already serving late-diagnosed autistic personnel is certain to rise.
Recognising this inevitable trend, it is important for leaders to:
Gain an understanding of the unique experiences and perspectives that autism brings,
be sensitive to the challenges that autistic people face,
and foster a culture of complete acceptance in your workplace for people who think and experience the world differently.
With a wealth of emerging content out there on what autism is, I highly recommend grabbing a brew and doing an online search or AI GPT prompt on common autism myths. This is a valuable way of encouraging meaningful and progressive discourse in your workplace since myths around autism range from dismissive to dangerous. For instance, you might like to have a go at starting a conversation around whether or not 'everybody is somewhere on the spectrum'. Ask if there is truth in this statement.
Ask why people so readily believe it. Ask what the real-life implications may be for autistic people if this belief remains as pervasive as it is now. If you read that statement and instantly dismissed it as...
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Zijn er afleveringen die ontbreken?
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In light of a number of somewhat braying articles1 in the mainstream media suggesting excessive 'wokeism' is rife within the military, it seemed an opportune moment to investigate many of the claims of Defence surrounding the topic of Diversity and Inclusion.
By and large, there are now two common uses of the term 'diversity':
The first, more traditional usage is an indication of variety, used such as when highlighting the unrivalled diversity of life within the Amazon rainforest, or the splendid diversity of Heinz' current soup range.
The second, social definition, employed more formally by Defence within this context, refers to an action, being "the recognition of differences between individuals or groups".
In relation to this latter definition, a second element is attached, that of 'inclusion', which the organisation characterises as "the effect of good diversity management ensuring that all individuals, no matter what their unique differences feel they belong [and are therein able to contribute effectively] to the wider team." A prudent step, given that recognition alone without action would amount to no change.
Combined, Diversity and Inclusion within this context therefore seek to optimise the relationships (through inclusion) between all the members of the force, based off understanding and acknowledgement of each individual's identified differences (Diversity). In this sense, diversity is seen as a start state, and inclusion a vehicle of action by which to optimise it.
Challenges?
This dual meaning of the word presents challenges when discussing diversity, as the two meanings are frequently conflated, or employed as if synonymous, which they are clearly not. For the sake of clarity this article almost exclusively refers to diversity in the traditional sense, referring to the prevalence of numerous assorted entities.
The 'Defence Diversity & Inclusion Vision' sees "Defence harness[ing] the power of difference to deliver capability that safeguards our nation…". In so doing Defence relies upon variation to exploit a fundamental assumption: that 'difference' (traditional diversity) is 'powerful' (beneficial).
This assumption is frequently rolled out within the often-used sentiment, or indeed statement, that 'diverse teams produce better results', that 'diversity and Inclusion are operationally essential', or any of the other combinations of similar words to the same effect.
The benefits of diversity
This article investigates the veracity of that assumption, finding, as one might expect, that 'it's a bit more complicated than that', and that actually, poorly managed diversity can be a net negative. In so doing, a large number of academic studies have been interrogated to form this image, spanning numerous categories of diversity, including race, sex, ability, age, culture, cognition, education and nationality.
In making a generalised and reductive summary the author acknowledges that some nuance between specific groups will inevitably be lost, however has endeavoured to summarise the literature fairly thus:
There are many, many benefits of diversity within teams, but also numerous downsides that should not be ignored.2 Most significantly, diverse teams typically3 outperform homogenous groups in finding optimal solutions to complex problems, especially those that require creative or innovative solutions.4 Whilst this sounds ideal, you still have to pay the piper somewhere, and the compromise is that the more diverse a team, the less effectively it communicates.
Finding the 'sweet spot' can be challenging.5 Extremely diverse teams, being less cohesive and less coherent, are harder to control, and often take longer conducting both complex and simple tasks as a result. This all makes pretty logical sense, as people with increasingly different perspectives may proportionally struggle to understand each other.
By contrast, homogenous teams are generally much more effective at completing simple tasks or those with a clear, dire...
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With defence in an unheralded period of uncertainty it is always pleasant to find some firm ground. To that end the notion that the use of simulation in military training will increase dramatically over the next 5 years will not cause much disagreement.
Against a training burden that has never been so intensive the MoD is faced with equipment costs increasing, availability of ammunition 1 decreasing and the complexity of training clashing with emerging restrictions. Simulation is a critical tool in tackling these problems.
Given the scale of this challenge, coupled with the breadth (more on this later) of the UK defence industry, integrating multiple systems into a single virtual2 battlefield (or Single Synthetic Environment) demands simple, understandable, interoperable and effective standards. We are not there.
Where are we?
The world of defence simulation is sufficiently opaque. This piece does not intend to add to that technical layer of fog. Rather it intends to explain the current issues as simply as possible, before offering three potential solutions.
In 2024 we are collectively spoiled. We are accustomed to the concept of "plug in and play" across our lives with HDMI cables, USB plugs, QI charging among others. So much so that one might casually assume that the same level of standardisation would be found in defence simulation hardware.
DIS3 (or the Distributed Interactive Simulation standard) was created in 1992 from work done with SimNet (created in 1987). Despite cancellation by NATO in 2010 it is still in use within the MoD. DIS's successor HLA4 (High Level Architecture), formed from a blend of DIS and ALSP (Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol) in 1996, is still 1 year older than the Nintendo64 game Goldeneye, at 28.
Despite iteration, both standards are outdated and limiting. This limitation is exacerbated by the number of adaptations being made with lenient, or in some cases no, centralised oversight (despite the valiant efforts of some in the UK through the Defence Policy for Modelling and Simulation - DMASC). Experimental Protocol Data Units (PDUs for short)5are network messages created by all parties to overcome the standard's shortfalls.
Their variance, lack of regulation and lack of standardisation have created a situation akin to the simulation Tower of Babel.
An unwillingness to conduct wholesale change, combined with a broader lack of understanding is now leading to the creation of an entirely unexpected problem - the launch of new products to overcome the shortfalls of DIS and HLA. Far from solving the problem by filling the gaps, this is adding to both the complexity and now the cost of new capabilities. Imagine the entire country having to use plug adaptors, just because manufacturers were unwilling to adhere to the Type G standard.
Nobody would tolerate it there: so why do we tolerate it in defence?
Solution 1: Unilateral not collaborative development.
There are 3 potential solutions to this issue and these will be looked at in increasing order of feasibility.
The MoD likes collaboration and partnerships and with the technological breadth and challenges on the global stage this has it's place. That being said, some of the biggest technological leaps of the last 20 years have been made by singular organisations headed up by empowered and focused leaders.
Nowhere would this difference in approach be more apparent than when comparing Project Purple (the 2005-2007 £120M development of the first generation iPhone) and Morpheus (the now cancelled 2017-2024 £690M component of the development of the next generation of tactical communications)6
Collaboration is critical to development but when that approach drifts into "design by committee", both from MoD and industry, things go wrong.
Especially when said collaboration is not being done to ensure best in class but to prop up a British defence industry landscape that is overburdened 7, when adjusted to a like for like comparison with the US DoD.
One way to ...
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At the end of January 2024 a Russian company from 33rd Motor Rifle Regiment 1 set off to attack in the area of Novomikhailovka, South-West of Donetsk City. The company comprised three T-72s leading one BMP-1 and seven MT-LBs (catastrophic attrition means the Russian Army now uses the MT-LB utility tracked vehicle as an APC). After leaving a hard-topped road the sub-unit fanned out to attack from the line of march across open fields. It didn't get too far.
The company was not stopped by mines or other engineering obstacles. Nor was it stopped by artillery or rocket fire. There were no anti-tank engagements and no Ukrainian tanks deployed to counter-attack. In fact, none of the elements of a defensive battle studied by a British Army cadet at Sandhurst, or student at the Defence College at Shrivenham, were present. The company was stopped by $500 FPV drones loaded with explosive charges.
All but one vehicle were damaged or destroyed and the survivors fled on foot.
'The price of such inability to learn is the death of people,' lamented the prominent Russian military blogger 'Rybar', 'the loss out of the blue of a heap of equipment for which industry works in three shifts, as well as landscapes of burning columns.' This article is about the developing story of 'the most important component of the battlefield' - the first person view (FPV) drone.
Intensity of attacks
In 2022, only a handful of FPV-drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones (as opposed to the Mavik-style drones that were becoming ubiquitous). By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since that period, attacks have grown exponentially on both sides.
In total, there have been 3,917 Russian attacks (with video evidence) as at 8 February. About half hit. Roughly 12% result in destruction of the target (479 targets) and 15% in damage (594 targets). Around 20% miss or are inconclusive. Ukrainian use is ahead but the Russian Army is catching up.
Setting aside the attrition - tactical drones of all types, with artillery, have become the biggest battlefield killers - their presence has radically altered the close battle. Both sides are now locked in a stalemate where any movement is quickly detected and threats neutralised by drones.
What is being targeted?
Analysis of what is being attacked shows clear differences in the targeting strategies of Ukrainian and Russian drone pilots. The Ukrainians mainly attack high-value target platforms, such as tanks, SP guns, EW systems, air defence systems, and logistic stores. The Russians overwhelmingly use FPV drones to support attacks on Ukrainian 'positions' - the trench lines and strong points.
Both sides have actually been attacking trenches regularly, with important implications for the design of trenches. Building overhead cover is no longer sufficient; a trench must be at least L-shaped because skilful drone pilots are flying the drones into the trenches.
Where are the attacks taking place?
With geo-location, open-source monitoring of drone attacks offers insights into where the fighting occurs (much as NASA FIRMS data unintentionally but usefully records heavy artillery or rocket fire as 'heat anomalies'). Tocnhyi.info January 2024 heat maps (shown below) reveal how the most active areas for drone attacks were the Krynky bridgehead in the west and the Avdiivka-Marinka sectors in the east.
At the former, Ukrainian defenders on the Dnipro right bank (at a higher elevation than the left bank) are using drones and artillery to keep a much larger Russian force at bay at the 36th Separate Marine Brigade bridgehead.
Innovation and democratisation
Over 200 firms are involved in drone production in Ukraine. More than 60 drone types have been developed and fielded, which is, in some respects, an unhelpful 'menagerie of drones'. Commercial training providers have sprung up, and drone 'shock companies' have been raised. Crowd-funding ...
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In an era of drones, loitering munitions, precision strikes, and manoeuvre warfare; discussing fortification seems almost quaint. Surely the revolution in military affairs and its successors have rendered bunkers and fixed positions irrelevant. If the future battlefield is transparent and the kill chain is as swift as proponents anticipate, staying still is a death sentence.
That is, of course, a trite assessment, but it reflects that very little consideration is given to hardened positions in the modern era. King's College London professor David Betz offers an interesting corrective to this misguided notion in his new book "The Guarded Age" (a copy of which was kindly provided for review by the publisher).
In the interests of full disclosure, Betz was one of my tutors at King's whilst I pursued my MA in War Studies. Readers will now undoubtedly attempt to divine how fairly he marked my papers based on the outcome of this review.
Fortifications are not just castles and bunkers, as Betz shrewdly shows. The process of fortification is, ultimately, about controlling and channelling the movement of forces and people (and data, too). Sensibly broadening the definition without losing fidelity allows for a more nuanced consideration. Fortifications are all around us when we stop and look. Indeed, much of urban design and planning incorporates fortification at a base level.
As the war in Gaza illustrates, cities themselves, both before and after destruction, are perhaps the ultimate fortified position. Designed to channel the flow of people when intact, they serve as superb hardened positions when destroyed - deadly for offensive forces but ideal for defenders, enabling them to hold key positions and tie down attackers with minimal resources.
Whether Haussman's redesign of Parisian streets to prevent the creation of barricades or the redesign of the Strand outside of King's College London and across from Bush House, city planning is about restricting movement and creating safety and security. From personal experience, the space outside King's was hazardous to students' health as lorries, cars, and cyclists competed for space.
After considerable renovation and redesign, the space outside the Strand Campus is a delightful haven for students.
There is a palpable sense of enthusiasm, tempered by shrewd professionalism, that suffuses Betz' writing and elevates his final product. "The Guarded Age" is a book that runs counter to the zeitgeist of defence and security writing, where everything is about mobility, manoeuvre, autonomy, and precision. In an era when everything seems fluid, writing about something that is fixed seems odd.
In less enthusiastic hands, the case for discussing and considering what fortifications are and could be would be harder to make. Writing about fortifications of the past? Decidedly easier. Writing about fixed positions and emplacements when everything is about drones and hypersonic munitions? Vastly more difficult.
Fortifications have a "strategic stratigraphy" to them, Betz writes. In essence, successive cultures, countries, or armed forces build upon the fortifications and embattlements of the past - a palimpsest approach to digging in and hardening positions. This, on reflection, is rather self-evidence but a novel way of looking at the bastions of the past and today. As others like Tim Marshall have eloquently written, geography still matters.
While it does certainly change due to geological, meteorological, and cartographic developments, high ground remains high ground, channels remain channels, and the desire for strategic advantage endures. Yet beyond the positioning of fortresses, their design remains strikingly consistent - stone walls are succeeded by Hesco barriers and moats are replaced by concrete bollards. Even the designs of the past are found in use today, with medieval star forts being replicated in the Sahel.
A good idea remains a good idea.
Perhaps the sole exception to this rule is in the r...
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NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) must prepare to protect the integrity of elections in Kosovo. This activity should be framed as a human security task.
Introduction: The need for support in Kosovo
As international pressure mounts on Kosovo to hold elections in the country's Serbian majority North, democratic values are at the forefront of international discourse. The likely and forthcoming election in Northern Kosovo presents an opportunity for KFOR to implement its existing security-focused mandate in accordance with the fundamental principles of NATO and the UN's human security approach.
Tensions and controversy have persisted since the ethnic Serb-Kosovars, who make up a majority in the north but a fraction of the overall Kosovar population, resigned en masse from state institutions in the region in November 2022, citing breaches of EU-mediated agreements between Serbia and Kosovo. Ethnic Albania-Kosovars replaced them following a municipal election in April 2023; the turnout was just 3.47%, which the Serb-Kosovars boycotted.
Violent protests by the Serb-Kosovar community ensued in May 2023, with continued resignations of Serb-Kosovars from further state institutions in August 2023, inflaming levels of communal animosity and making prospects of an election rerun precarious. In September 2023 an armed attack in the village of Banjska on Kosovo police left four dead (a local police sergeant and three of the attackers).
The deputy head of the Serbian List (the political grouping which represents most of the ethnic Serb-Kosovars) later admitted to organising and taking part in the incident. In October 2023 the Serbian List - backed by Serbian President Vucic - said it was ready to participate in new municipal elections in Northern Kosovo. By December 2023 reports emerged that ethnic Serb-Kosovars will attempt to follow the electoral commission's procedure to trigger new municipal elections.
NATO can safeguard elections in Kosovo by deterring the threat of violence in coordination with the Kosovo Police and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), providing a visible presence near polling centres to reassure and protect the local population - both Albanian-Kosovars and Serb-Kosovars - and secure the right to vote in a peaceful electoral process.
Military planners should frame the support and measure its subsequent impact through the lens of NATO's human security policy. In doing so, NATO progresses its portfolio of human security-related activities and deepens its expertise in democracy support expertise.
Outcomes from Election Safeguarding: The Human Security Imperative in Northern Kosovo
Northern Kosovo has a complex history marked by ethnic tensions and contemporary geopolitical influences. It requires a comprehensive approach to security, particularly as it approaches flashpoints such as elections. The specified tasking of safeguarding elections should be framed as a complementary human security activity for KFOR, which will contribute towards the following outcomes:
Protecting the Democratic Process
Free and fair elections are the foundation of democracy, enabling citizens to express their will peacefully. However, in regions like Northern Kosovo electoral processes will be susceptible to disruption including violence.
Like military forces in the Central African Republic, Nigeria, NATO itself in Afghanistan in 2005 and the forthcoming Mexico election, KFOR can help to ensure a secure environment on election day by guarding near polling stations and access routes, escorting administrative staff, and ensuring freedom of movement for residents to participate with a reduced risk of violence or fear from coercion.
Preventing Conflict, Instability and Displacement
A continued and enhanced show of force from KFOR will seek to deter violence before and after the election, safeguarding citizens and officials - such as beekeeper and ethnic Albanian-Kosovar Mayor Lulzim Hetemiwho has sought to sleeping in his office due ...
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Over the last few weeks a series of speeches have described the Russian threat to peace in Europe. On 10 January, Sweden's Civil Defence Minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin asserted that 'there could be war in Sweden'. This warning was reinforced by the Swedish military commander-in-chief, Gen Micael Byden, suggested that Swedes should mentally prepare for this to happen.
On 15 January the UK's Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps, told the assembled audience at Lancaster House that a 'pre-war' 'inflection point' had been reached.1 Just two days after that, the Dutch Chair of NATO's Military Committee, Admiral Robert Bauer warned that the era of predictability was over and that NATO needed a 'warfighting transformation' as an all-out war with Russia could happen at any stage in the next twenty years.4
What, you may ask, is going on?
The procession of dire warnings have led commentators to ponder whether the UK's fighting age population are ready, willing and mentally prepared for what they may be required to do. This is nothing new.
In the early 1900s the ruling upper strata of post-Edwardian society worried that the social and psychological character of the urban working class had made them unfit to fight a major war.5 Of course, the vast majority of the working classes did not flinch in responding to the call to arms during the First World War.
Indeed, it was the middle and upper class students at Oxford University who, in 1933, debated and passed, by 275 votes to 153, a motion proposed by Cyril Edwin Mitchinson Joad that 'This House will under no circumstances fight for King and Country'. Whether or not the majority of the current population feels that modern Britain represents their cultural aspirations - and is therefore worth fighting for - is, perhaps, a more prescient concern.6
Regarding the scale of the Russia threat, a study, in 2018, compared the size of its economy with that of the American state of Texas. Texas's economy, with its rapidly growing population, was adjudged the larger. It was noted that Russia's population was shrinking due to low birth rates.
7 That said, the dictum that you need a strong economy to have strong national defence forces does not seem to apply to hybrid-totalitarian states.8 Nevertheless, there comes a point at which war casualties and economic fragility coalesce. A U.S. Intelligence assessment reported that by December 2023 as many as 315,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or injured in the war in Ukraine, and that the losses in that war had set back Russia's military modernisation by 18 years.
If correct, should we be that concerned about the likelihood that Russia will attack a recently enlarged NATO in western Europe in the next decade?9 What do Byden, Bauer and Pistorius know that overrides the logic of Lanchester's square law? Perhaps the Americans have told their European friends that when the situation in Ukraine is resolved they will concentrate on Asia and expect the Europeans to defend themselves against a militarily reinvigorated but economically fragile Russia.
NATO's defence is predicated on the assumption that each country will spend at least 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence. After America decided to pivot to Asia, President Barak Obama's administration hoped that its European NATO allies would embrace the idea of 'Smart Defence', where national capabilities and resources were pooled and shared to optimize their effectiveness.
This concept appears to have been designed to make up for the absence of some American capabilities in Europe and the Mediterranean.10 Europe's ability to satisfy this desire rested on the character of their leaders and their willingness to spend their fair share of their country's GDP on defence.
Unfortunately, Obama had a tendency to assess the leaders of Europe's largest economic and military states by the depth of their experience and their progressive credentials, rather than by their commitment to European security and defence. He tho...
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On 26 February, Russian forces west of Avdiivka destroyed the first M1A1 Abrams tank of the war. Like the loss of the first Challenger 2 near Robotyne last September the event has provoked widespread commentary. This article seeks to establish the facts and draw lessons. Even after two years of war, no NATO army has seriously addressed the threat to its armoured fleets - not just tanks - from the revolution taking place on the frontlines of Ukraine from the proliferation of cheap drones.
Unless thought is given to this problem, every tank fleet faces the same fate as the M1A1 Abrams examined in this article.
What happened - the Ukrainian side of the story
On 17 February, Ukrainian forces withdrew from Avdiivka following a four-and-a-half month battle. This battle, incidentally, cost the Russians 224 tanks, according to the dedicated Oryx analyst who started counting the losses when the assaults started in October.
47 Separate Mechanised Brigade (47 OMBr) had been defending the flank north of Avdiivka. Following the withdrawal, the brigade fell back from the contested rail line and front line village of Stepove and took positions two kilometres west in Berdychi. Both settlements exist only in name as they have been wholly destroyed.
47 OMBr had previously distinguished itself in the Robotyne sector during the 2023 summer counter-offensive. Over this period the brigade was supported by Leopard 2A6s from a separate tank battalion as its organic tank battalion was delayed in Germany training on a batch of M1A1 Abrams. The organic tank battalion was only finally taken under command on 23 February this year. Two days later the first YouTube video of an M1A1 Abrams appeared on the internet. The following day the loss occurred.
On 26 February, two Russian assault groups had broken through the defence line of neighbouring troops. A forward position was in danger of being surrounded. In the words of 47 OMBr 'Thanks to the actions of the crew of Abrams, Bradley, artillery strikes and drones of the 47th brigade, two Russian assault groups were destroyed, and our infantrymen withdrew.' In this action, the Bradley killed eight helpless Russian infantryman dropped off by a BTR-82A with cannon fire.
The fleeing vehicle was then destroyed by an FPV drone.
The M1A1 Abrams was fitted with ECM but it did not work. The Ukrainians speculate the reason was frequency changes on the command link of the Russian FPV drones. Crews had attempted to fit protective 'grills' but without success due to 'the features of the tank design'. This has generally been true of all the Western-supplied tanks, in comparison with Russian tanks that are now rarely observed without fitted 'barbecues' (the protective grills or screens).
What happened - the Russian side of the story
The Russian unit involved in the attack was the Recce-Strike Group from 15th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle1 commanded by an individual with call sign 'Kolovrat'('Spinning Wheel'). The drone pilot was an individual with call sign Rassvet ('Dawn'). In his words, 'We found the target and went around him from behind. It [the FPV drone] hit the rear part. The tank was stopped first.' Attacking the turret rear has become the standard tactic of drone pilots on both sides.
The strike caused an exterior fire. The crew baled and abandoned the tank. A second drone was then launched. The second strike caused an ammunition fire and the tank burned out (but did not detonate catastrophically in the manner of Russian tanks).
The FPV drone used in the attack
The M1A1 Abrams was a victim of a Piranha-10 FPV drone costing around 50,000 roubles ($500). (The Challenger 2 last year was hit in the engine compartment by a Lancet loitering munition; this also started a fire).
The Simbirsk Design Bureau (SKB) 'Piranha', based in Ulyanovsk, makes two variants of the Piranha - Piranha-7 (2.5kg warhead) and Piranha-10 (4.5kg warhead). At first, SKB Piranha copied Chinese FPV drones. Today it manufactures purely indigeno...
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As the famous quote from Sun Tzu's Art of War goes, "rapidity is the essence of war" (兵之情主速), and while the original context behind this adage was more tactical in nature, advocating the use of rapid manoeuvres to dislocate the enemy, it is also reflective of one of the most desired outcomes in war - a swift and decisive victory.
In the same military treatise, Sun Tzu strongly admonished against carelessly resorting to war, highlighting the great strain it places on the state. By extension, if there must be war, it should be kept as brief as possible. Of course, defining an ideal duration is subjective, but the point is that the benefits to be gained through war diminish with time. This is especially true for small states, which have relatively humbler means compared to their larger counterparts.
Indeed, this practical reality is reflected in the mission statement of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) which articulates clearly its intent to achieve a swift and decisive victory in the event of war.
Yet, recent conflicts such as the ongoing Russian-Ukraine War and the latest Israel-Hamas war highlight significant challenges toward attaining this strategic ideal. The former will soon enter its third year with no clear end in sight while the latter continues to witness fierce fighting in the Gaza strip more than two months since the commencement of Operation Iron Swords, Israel's military response to Hamas' 7 October surprise attack.
To put this in context, the Six-Day War and Yom Kippur War, two of Israel's most significant military campaigns since independence, did not last more than a month combined. Is the notion of a swift and decisive victory then still feasible in the context of modern warfare, or is it an unattainable ideal?
Keeping Wars Short
The appeal for states to resolve military conflicts expediently is understandable given the costly nature of war today in terms of both men and material. For example, the latest estimated military losses suffered by Ukraine since February 2022 in its ongoing war with Russia range from between 25,000 to 70,000 dead - a staggering number for a military that by the best estimates started out with only about 196,000 active personnel and 900,000 in reserve.
This does not even factor in the number of wounded and war material lost. Then there is the collateral damage, with many Ukrainian cities destroyed in the fighting and millions of citizens displaced. Ukraine's economy has likewise suffered because of the war, with its gross domestic product (GDP) falling by 29.1% in just the first year.
For smaller states, such costs would be simply unsustainable and there is thus even greater impetus to attain a conclusive military outcome in the shortest period possible. With relatively scarcer resources and a lack of strategic depth inherent to having a smaller physical size, entanglements in prolonged campaigns or costly wars of attrition are far from ideal.
Victories in such conflicts are pyrrhic at best while defeat can be fatal to the state's long-term vitality, leaving it vulnerable to the predations of opportunistic aggressors.
Furthermore, the political nature of modern warfare means that the longer a war lasts, the more difficult it is to sustain public and international support, forcing policy makers to settle for a compromised and possibly disadvantageous peace. Already, there are calls for Ukraine to negotiate an end to the war, bearing in mind that it would likely mean surrendering much of the territory it has thus far lost.
Worryingly, such calls have been accompanied by a dangerous faltering of the external military aid that is so essential to Ukraine's war effort.
Similarly, the calls for Israel to rein it its ongoing offensive in Gaza are becoming increasingly vociferous despite its desire to seek a more decisive outcome in the field. This is why Israel's strategic doctrine has historically favoured speedy operations and short wars, noting the possibility of intervention by both reg...
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Introduction
The future is uncertain. Yet, we still attempt to plan for an uncertain future. Since 2001, the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) Global Strategic Trends programme has sought to 'identify the key drivers of change that will shape and reshape our world'. Global Strategic Trends is supported by the Future Operating Environment publication, which 'aims to provide a long-term analysis of the key characteristics of the operating environment in 2035'.
While the data exists in these publications, bringing them to life might seem like a work of fiction. By exploring future worlds through an AI-generated lens, I strongly believe the images produced can help us imagine different future operating environments and facilitate conversations about the implications for defence in an uncertain future.
Future Worlds
The MoD's current Global Strategic Trends publication articulates four future worlds: Multilateralism, Multipolarity, Network of actors, and Fragmentation. These worlds are defined using two variables: the distribution of power and cooperation. The publication states that 'distribution of power varies between centralised power (where states are the main actors) at one end of the spectrum, and diffused power (where state power is eroded and the power of non-state actors increases)'.
The level of cooperation varies from full and open cooperation at one end of the spectrum to intense competition between actors at the other.1 Global Strategic Trends builds on these future worlds with a specific focus on conflict and security. Each of these future worlds will be considered in turn.
Methodology
Bing Image Creator was used to create all four AI-generated images used in this article. The number of variables for each image differed depending on the factors identified as appropriate for that future world. For each image, several versions were produced as factors were added and removed to adjust the images until the image met the author's vision of that specific future world.
This approach clearly introduces a number of biases - both those within the the image creator as well as the author's own in selecting specific images.
Multilateralism
Global Strategic Trends sees a Multilateralism world as one where:
'States are the most influential actors in the global order. Almost all states use multilateral institutions to address global challenges, define legal frameworks and settle disputes. Good global governance is a characteristic of this world.'2
With specific reference to conflict and security, we are told that 'cooperation reduces the requirement for defence spending' and 'defence capabilities are frequently employed on operations other than war, for example, humanitarian and disaster relief operations'.3 The following terms were used to generate the image for the Multilateralism world: powerful states, multinational institutions, global governance, peace, military providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and impressionism.
The image shows a world being gently lifted out of the water by a pair of hands. Only one pair of hands perhaps symbolises the unity of those nations represented by the flags. The dark clouds on the horizon and the rising waters could symbolise the impact of climate change and the effort required to address the global challenges brought on by climate change. Although military capabilities from various nations surround the world, they appear separate from it.
The ground forces, in particular, appear to be standing idly by, and this brings into question the role of the military in this future world.
In a multilateralism world, future leaders are likely to unite against global challenges such as climate change, and such 'cooperation reduces the need for defence spending.'4 If this is the case, and the focus shifts to humanitarian aid and disaster relief, will nations see militaries shrink to small but specialised teams capable of supporting humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations?
Multipolarity
Global...
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As the UK enters the third decade of the 21st century, it is confronted by a strategic system in flux. This is particularly highlighted by the resurgence of great power rivalry, the renewed Russian threat to regional and international security, the shifting global balance of power from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, the rise of China as a global power, regional instability in the Middle East, and wider geopolitical shifts.
This is compounded by the Trump Administration's approach to foreign policy, particularly it's attitude towards arms control and reported interest in resuming nuclear testing, and the potential impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.
It is likely that defence budgets will come under intense pressure due to the economic impact of the pandemic, however, given the deteriorating geopolitical environment, significant defence cuts may only serve to embolden potential adversaries seeking to change local or, indeed, the international status quo. Moreover, the UK itself is at a critical strategic juncture with the opportunities inherent in its withdrawal from the European Union.
Ahead of the forthcoming Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review, discussion of the UK's strategic priorities and balance of capabilities is warranted. In this regard, this article considers whether the UK should invest in a more substantial long-range strike capability, namely some form of bomber.
The evolving strategic environment and its implications
The development of a long-range bomber capability would constitute a significant investment and a marked shift in the composition of British airpower. The UK retired its last dedicated long-range bomber, the Vulcan, in 1984, but has retained an interest in a long-range strike capability since.
This has included the use of the Tornado for long-range strike operations including with the Storm Shadow stand-off cruise missile, as part of the abortive Future Offensive Air System programme to replace the Tornado, and the potential integration of the Storm Shadow with the cancelled Nimrod MRA4.
Andrew Brookes, writing in RUSI's World Defence Systems in August 2003 stated with regard to the latter: 'With its range of over 6,000nm, the datalink equipped Nimrod MRA4 positioned at six facilities could provide almost global strike coverage when armed with five Storm Shadows and supported by in-flight refuelling'. Whilst in June 2020, Air Marshal (ret'd) Greg Bagwell, writing in Air Forces Monthly, stated:
So, do I think the UK or countries like it should invest in their own 21st-century bombers? Well, I can certainly see value in having the ability to launch larger numbers of smart weapons from larger platforms, but I do not see the need for an expensive, niche platform able to penetrate sophisticated enemy defences.
Air Marsal (Retd) Greg Bagwell
In considering whether the UK should invest in a long-range bomber, three particular factors warrant discussion: the evolving strategic system and its implications; recent operational experience and the prospective operating environment; and the direction of British national policy in the coming decades.
The strategic environment is characterised by uncertainty, including a core principle underpinning British strategic thinking since the end of the Second World War: the reliability of the US as the 'guarantor' of international security.
The actions of the Trump administration, for example, with regard to military threats against Iran, including the June 2019 crisis following Iran's downing of a Global Hawk unmanned air vehicle (UAV), and the January 2020 crisis following the US assassination of General Soleimani, strategic arms control (highlighted by the US approach toward renewing the New START treaty with Russia), and wider questions concerning President Trump's approach to foreign policy, raise questions over the
reliability of the US in the event of a crisis.
Moreover, the rise of China, and with it, the re-emergence of a bipolar internat...
