Afleveringen
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In this episode, we discuss:
*The timeline of major events of the Battle for the Irpin
*Three occasions where the Russians nearly won the battle
*The role of Ukrainian volunteers and civilians
*The role of small unit leaders
*The artillery fight
*The challenges of researching and writing operational military history
*James and Ben’s research approach
*The lack of government support in the US and UK for on-the-ground conflict research
*The value of stories to the military profession
*How the battle study can be used for training and educational
Links
"The Battle of Irpin River" by James Sladden, Liam Collins, and Ben Connable
https://chacr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/BAR-187-compressed.pdf
"Battle Studies: The Need for Primary Source Research" by Ben Connable and James Sladden
https://chacr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/CHACR-Briefing-Ukraine.pdf
"On the Ground: Field Research in Ukraine" by James Sladden
https://issuu.com/chacr_camberley/docs/idb-ukraine
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In this episode, we discuss the following topics.
*What a combat engineer platoon does as part of a battalion landing team
*What it was like joining BLT 1/8
*Building trust between Everett’s platoon and BLT 1/8
*Everett’s advice to platoon commanders looking to build trust between units
*His platoon’s training plan for the 24th MEU workup
*Responding to complaints from Marines about a high-tempo schedule
*The platoon’s experiences on the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA
*When the possibility of deploying to HKIA first came on Everett’s radar
*His reaction and his Marines’ reactions to learning they would go to HKIA
*Being labeled “the lead combat engineer for HKIA”
*The tough decision to leave Marines behind on ship
*The value of crossing training
*The first few days on the ground at HKIA
*Reactions to the news that the Taliban would cooperate with the Coalition
*Working at Abbey, East, and North Gates
*The last phase of the withdrawal
*Creativity and problem-solving at HKIA
*Radio communications during the NEO
*Everett’s advice for lieutenants who may find themselves in situations like at HKIA
*The training he received at Marine Corps Engineer School
*Enemy contact at HKIA
*Dismantling several of HKIA’s guard towers
*Command and control at HKIA
*Maneuver warfare concepts applied at HKIA
*What Everett was doing the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing
*Talking to his platoon about the Marine losses at HKIA
*What Everett observed in his Marines after the NEO
*Returning to Camp Lejeune
*Everett’s advice on talking to people who have experienced a mission as harrowing as HKIA
*The value of professional reading
*The role and value of mental health checks and mental health services
*The role of cell phones at HKIA
*Cleaning up various parts of HKIA
*The role of discipline
*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA mission
*Everett’s pride in the performance of his Marines
*The most challenging decision he made at HKIA
*Where Everett excelled as a commander and decision-maker and where he could have done better
*The lessons he took away from HKIA, particularly as they apply to FD 2030 and the future Marine Corps
*The role and value of decision games to train and educate Marines for missions like HKIA
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Zijn er afleveringen die ontbreken?
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In this episode, we discuss the following topics.
*Josh’s joining 1/8
*Differences in morale and culture between units in the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions
*The current culture and unit pride in 1/8
*Recent controversies involving Third Battalion, Sixth Marines
*The challenges and benefits of leading HKIA vets in his squad
*Winning the 2nd Marine Division Annual Rifle Squad Competition and Marine Corps-Wide Rifle Squad Competition
*How winning the competition affirmed Josh’s identity as an infantryman
*Struggling with imposter syndrome
*Josh’s experiences during his deployment to Haiti in support of Continuing Promise 2022
*What makes an ideal squad leader
*Josh’s use of military simulators like Squad and Arma 3 for training purposes
*Josh’s expectations for his:
Junior Marines
Fire team leaders
Fellow squad leaders
Platoon commander
Company commander
*The one thing he’d like current and future squad leaders to take away from this podcast
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In this episode, we discuss the following topics.
*Josh’s experiences with squad leaders up to this point in his career
*How these leaders influenced him
*His experiences going through the reconnaissance training pipeline and serving with 3rd Recon Battalion
*His decision to leave the recon community and the shame he felt as a result
*Josh's deployments with the 31st MEU
*The “golden nuggets” of leadership he took from his first squad leader
*How Josh approaches corrective actions
*The benefits of having a strong NCO and squad leader core within a unit
*Creating such a core and the challenges to doing so
*Josh's thoughts on what makes a “real” deployment
*Why many Marines don’t see MEUs as "real" deployments
*Josh's advice for squad leaders on making the most of MEUs
*His experiences supporting operations on the US-Mexico border
*His advice for fighting complacency during monotonous missions
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In this episode, we discuss the following topics.
*Andres’ operational experiences before joining 2/1
*The organization and strength of Weapons Company, 2/1, at the beginning of its deployment with the SP-MAGTF-CR
*The company’s deployment prior to heading to HKIA
*When the Afghanistan mission first appeared on the company’s radar
*Managing Marines’ expectations in the run-up to deploying to HKIA
*Preparing to leave for HKIA
*Weapons Company’s first day at HKIA
*The company’s initial taskings
*Andres’ reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban
*The challenges of commanding a dispersed company
*Andres’ experiences at Abbey Gate before 26 August
*Interacting with the many Coalition forces at Abbey Gate
*How often Andres used the tools and concepts in MCDP-1 and MCDP 1-3
*Receiving messages from individuals and interest groups in the US asking for help evacuating people, and how these affected operations
*Some of the challenges Andres and his Marines experienced at Abbey Gate
*Two specific instances where Andres and his Marines helped evacuate Afghan children
*What Weapons Company and Andres were doing on 26 August
*Weapons Company’s role in the demil process at Kabul
*What Andres observed in his Marines and himself after returning to Kuwait
*His advice on how to talk to leaders about harrowing experiences
*The use of cell phones at HKIA
*Andres’ interactions with US State Department officials at HKIA
*The logistics challenges of HKIA
*The discipline of Andres’ Marines at HKIA
*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA experience
*Shifting between a combat mindset and a humanitarian mindset
*The most challenging decision Andres made at HKIA
*Where Andres performed well as a decision-maker and leader HKIA and where he could have performed better
*What lessons he took away from HKIA and how those might apply in the context of FD 2030
*Tactical decision game as tools to prepare Marines for operations like HKIA
Link
"Witnesses to the End" by Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 7 Nov 2021
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In this episode, we discuss:
*Mr. Smith joining 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, in Vietnam and assuming command of his platoon
*His staff NCOs, especially SSgt Richard Jackson and Gunnery Sergeant Alan Sora, and other Marines and Sailors who deeply influenced him
*Coping with the loss of subordinate leaders and advice on dealing with such losses
*Combat decision-making
*The challenges of returning home from war and transitioning to the civilian sector
*The Ken Burns’ documentary series The Vietnam War
*The US strategy in Vietnam
*The role veterans played in building and expanding FedEx
*The cutting-edge technologies FedEx has used, emerging technologies, and the future of warfare
*The central role of logistics in war
*Leading FedEx through the Arab Oil Embargo Crisis of 1973 and advice for leaders dealing with crises
*How Mr. Smith’s approach to leadership has evolved
*The value of reading for leaders
Links
The Grunt Padre: Father Vincent Robert Capodanno, Vietnam, 1966-1967 by Father Daniel L. Mode
https://a.co/d/aCfeUeQ
The Vietnam War: A Film by Ken Burns
https://www.amazon.com/gp/video/detail/B0753XH4H2/ref=atv_dp_share_cu_r
For Country and Corps: The Life of General Oliver P. Smith by Gail B. Shisler
https://a.co/d/7IWlQ8l
Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam by H.R. McMaster
https://a.co/d/1xKTIl1
Call Sign: Chaos by James Mattis and Bing West
https://a.co/d/08lP0kg
Sapiens by Yuval Noah Harari
https://a.co/d/7rsFs5g
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In this episode, we discuss:
*Connor's time with Marine Security Forces
*Corporals Course
*Serving in 1/7 as a squad leader and overcoming the stigma of Security Forces NCOs
*The Advanced Infantry Marine Course
*Connor’s deployment to Darwin, Australia
*Keeping Marines in a forward-deployed mindset
*What excited Connor most about being a squad leader
*What concerned him most
*Some of the mistakes he’s made as a squad leader
*The atmosphere and culture he tried to create in his first squad
*The training and PME programs he implemented
*Balancing the demands of bureaucracy with preparing Marines for combat
*Connor’s expectations for his junior Marines, fire team leaders, fellow squad leaders, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, and company commander
*What makes an ideal squad leader
*Balancing one's personal life with dedication to the profession of arms
*What makes a squad leader from hell
*The most important thing squad leaders do besides leading Marines in combat and preparing them for it
*Connor’s experiences as a platoon sergeant in 1/8
*The one thing Connor would have liked to have known about his platoon before becoming its platoon sergeant
*The current culture and atmosphere in 1/8
*Connor’s philosophy of leadership and how it’s evolved
*His thoughts on TDGs and their facilitation
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In this episode, we discuss:
*Matt's decision to join the Marine Corps
*His experiences at boot camp and the School of Infantry-East
*His experiences with squad leaders up to this point in his career
*How well the Marine Corps is preparing him to be a squad leader
*The Advanced Infantry Marine Course
*Matt's experiences as a team leader, assistant patrol leader, and acting squad leader
*What makes an ideal squad leader
*What makes a squad leader from hell
*Matt's philosophy of leadership
*What excites him most about being a future squad leader
*What concerns him most
*His ideas for training his future squad
*The kind of atmosphere he wants to create in the squad
*The current culture and atmosphere in 1/8
*Matt's thoughts on maneuver warfare
*Balancing the demands of bureaucracy with preparing Marines for combat
*The one thing Matt would like to know about his future squad before becoming its leader
*His expectations for his junior Marines, fire team leaders, fellow squad leaders, platoon sergeant, platoon commander, and company commander
*The value of tactical decision games (TDGs)
*1/8's summer 2023 TDG tournament
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In this episode, we discuss:
*Col Glantz’s Vietnam service
*How his experiences in Vietnam influenced him as a military historian and researcher
*What led him to study the Nazi-Soviet War
*The Army’s Art of War Symposia from 1984-1987
*How the Soviet Army and US Army defined doctrine (move???)
*The case for an operational level of war
*The introduction of the operational level of war to US Army doctrine
*The origins of the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine
*The 11 January 1976 Incident
*The evolution of Soviet operational mobile groups, tank corps, tank armies, and mechanized corps
*The concept of lessons learned and Col Glantz’s critique of it
*The Soviet approach to lessons learned, including the practice of Socialist Criticism
*The effect Stalin’s purges on the officer corps had on the Soviet military’s performance in World War II
*Col Glantz’s thoughts on why the Soviets didn’t march on Berlin in February 1945
*Comparing and Contrasting Zhukov and Rokossovsky
*How and why Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, failed
*Turning points of the Eastern Front
*Forgotten battles of the war
*Major myths of the war
*Correlation of forces
*Initiative and risk-taking in the Red Army
*Improvements in Soviet training
*German and Soviet penal battalions
*The work of Jack Radey and Charles Sharp
*Notable Soviet and German amphibious operations
*Some of the discoveries Col Glantz made in writing his trilogy on Stalingrad
*Similarities between the Soviet storm groups and the German stormtrooper units of WWII
*The 7th and 8th Guards Tank Armies as a potential “pocketforce” at the end of WWII
*The relative levels of military-theoretical development the Soviets and Western Allies had reached by May 1945
*The Russian-language military history websites Col Glantz uses for research
*The movies Enemy at the Gates and Stalingrad
The founding of The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, now The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and some of its more noteworthy pieces
*Persistent errors, misconceptions, and faulty interpretations in the literature of the Nazi-Soviet war
*Col Glantz’s advice to young scholars of the Soviet-Nazi War
*What service members can learn from the Eastern Front today, and Col Glantz’s advice on studying the war
*Areas of the Nazi-Soviet War we know relatively little about and where Col Glantz would like to see research done
*Col Glantz’s current projects
*His thoughts on the war in Ukraine
Errata
*Col Glantz states that Hermann Balck was the commander of 48th Panzer Corps during the German relief attempt of the Stalingrad Pocket. Balck, however, was the commander of 11th Panzer Division, a subordinate formation of 48th Panzer Corps.
Links
Col Glantz’s Amazon page
Col Glantz’s website for his self-published atlases and works
When Titans Clashed by Col David Glantz
Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat by Col David Glantz
The Soviet-German War: Myths and Realities by Col David Glantz
Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks: The World War II Memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza
Fighting for the Soviet Motherland: Recollections from the Eastern Front by Dmitriy Loza
The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flankby Jack Radey and Charles Sharp
Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster Through Soviet Eyes by Col David Glantz
Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War II by Col David Glantz
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In this episode, we discuss the following topics.
*What drew Kendrick to study military innovation
*How he defines military innovation
*What conventional wisdom says about military innovation
*How innovation differs from adaption
*Some recent historical examples of military innovation
*Whether military innovation fails more often than it succeeds
*Popular instances of military innovation in the West
*Kendrick’s essay “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness”
*What drives innovation in military organizations
*Warped innovation
*Incremental vs. radical innovation
*What drew Kendrick to studying British armored warfare innovation during the Interwar Period and the British Army’s experiences in North Africa as a case of military innovation
*The US Army’s Pentomic Divisions
*Guarding or hedging against dangerous innovations
*The claim that the character of war is changing rapidly
*Force Design 2030
*Communication strategies in support of military innovation efforts
*The innovator's dilemma as it applies to the military innovator
*Innovation and adaptation in Ukraine
*Recommended books on military innovation and military effectiveness
*Defining and measuring military effectiveness
*The prospect of the US forces fighting another counterinsurgency war or low-intensity conflict
*Kendrick’s upcoming articles
Links
“Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,” by Kendrick Kuo, International Security
https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/2/48/113546/Dangerous-Changes-When-Military-Innovation-Harms
“The Future of Military Innovation Studies” by Adam Grissom, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390600901067?journalCode=fjss20
“What is a Military Innovation and Why It Matters” by Michael Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2022.2038572
“Aircraft Carriers Versus Battleships in War and Myth” with James R. FitzSimonds, YouTube
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hD43yEnbfL4
“Future Visions and Planned Obsolescence: Implementing 30-Year Horizons in Defense Planning” by Travis Reese and Dylan Phillips-Levine, CIMSEC
https://cimsec.org/future-visions-and-planned-obsolescence-implementing-30-year-horizons-in-defense-planning/
Steve Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military
https://a.co/d/88ckH5T
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (revised edition) edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett
https://a.co/d/1gUNGcc
The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars by Barry Posen
https://a.co/d/dEJSypm
Technological Change and the Future of Warfare by Michael O’Hanlon
https://a.co/d/5NBsZl6
The Innovation Delusion: How Our Obsession with the New Has Disrupted the Work That Matters Most by Lee Vinsel and Andrew Russell
https://a.co/d/gFFzzHH
The Shock Of The Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 by David Edgerton
https://a.co/d/6oaUtZk
“Superiority,” a short story by Arthur C. Clarke
https://www.baen.com/Chapters/1439133476/1439133476___5.htm
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Please visit: www.oarfoundation.org
In this episode, we discuss the following topics.
*Aaron’s thoughts on the two-year anniversary of Copperhead Company’s arrival at HKIA
*His experiences as a rifle platoon commander with the 26th MEU and combat advisor with TF Southwest and how these influenced the way he led at HKIA
*C/1/8’s deployment with the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA
*The company’s training and preparations for the NEO
*TDGs and the benefits they provide for learning ROEs
*How TDGs translated to real-world application at HKIA
*When C/1/8 first got news it was heading to Kabul for sure and the reaction of the Marines
*Aaron’s understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA
*C/1/8’s first day there, 15 August
*The company’s role in the fight for the airfield and perimeter security
*1/8’s employment of maneuver warfare concepts and tools
*Aaron’s reaction to the National Strike Unit’s clearing of the airfield
*Instances where Coppehead Company came under fire
*Concerns that Coalition forces might have to carry out an “Alamo” operation in northern HKIA
*Aaron’s reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban
*Charlie Company’s opening of North and East Gates as evacuation control centers
*A detailed summary of events and commentary on gate operations at East Gate
*What it was like working with the Taliban
*The need to become emotionally hardened while working with the crowds
*How these crowds could quickly become the enemy in situations
*Charlie Company’s fight to provide and maintain a sense of calm, order, and process for the crowd
*The appearance of the NSU at East Gate
*The concepts of unity of command and battlespace and their application at East Gate
*Special operators and special missions and the effects these had on gate operations
*The decision to give up the picket line at East Gate
*The continued relevance of MCDP-1 Warfighting
*What C/1/8 was doing on 26 August, the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing, and how it responded to the situation
*The company’s actions between 27 August and its departure from HKIA
*The rules of engagement at HKIA
*What Aaron observed in himself and his Marines your Marines in the aftermath of the mission
*His advice for future leaders on talking to their people about going through situations like HKIA
*The role of mental health checks, mental services, and other kinds of support
*What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune
*The influence and role of cell phones at HKIA
*The demil efforts
*The order to clean up trash
*The ROEs at HKIA
*Aaron’s interactions with the State Department
*Support provided by the BLT’s engineer platoon
*The MEU’s Female Search Team?
*Creating and maintaining a culture of discipline within Charlie Company
*The roles that exhaustion and discipline played at HKIA
*The actions of Coppehead Company that make Aaron proudest
*His self-assessment as a leader and decision-maker at HKIA
*The lessons he took away from HKIA, including those with potential implications for FD 2030
*Operating in a way that accounts for long-term implications of decisions
*The one thing Aaron would like Marines and other service members to know about what C/1/8 did at HKIA
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Link to Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) Foundation
OAR Foundation’s Instagram handle: OARfoundation
Lee’s Instagram handle: Leer_Bow
In this episode, we discuss the following topics.
*The skills and missions of EOD Marines
*How Lee’s previous five deployments shaped the way he led and made decisions at HKIA
*The people and organization of Blackbeard's EOD Section
*What Lee’s 2021 deployment with the 24th MEU looked like before heading to HKIA
*The section’s preparation for HKIA
*Lee’s preparations for the mission
*Lee’s understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA
*Working with other US EOD teams
*The inherently joint nature of the NEO
*The missions of the Blackbeard teams that did not make it to HKIA
*The fall of the US embassy in Kabul
*Some of the challenges posed by the geometries of fire at HKIA
*Lee’s participation in trying to clear the runway
*His advice to service members who might find themselves in similar situations
*Lee’s reaction to Coalition forces partnering with the Taliban
*What Lee’s teams did 20-22 August
*His involvement in an incident where civilians risked overrunning the Military Terminal
*Widespread failures to inform refugees about each step of the evacuation process
*The value of Afghan refugees who spoke English and could serve as interpreters
*The atrophy of electronic countermeasure skills in the Marine Corps
*Finding large caches of weapons and ammo aboard HKIA
*The two holding areas at the airport
*Lee’s tour of the gates
*The frustration Lee felt as pressure built to evacuate as many refugees as possible while also conducting a joint tactical exfiltration
*Being told by the JTF-CR staff that controlled detonations of gear and weapons were prohibited
*The JTF’s decision to bury ammo and arms
*An incident involving friendly fire between 1/8 Marines and the NSU
*Blackbeard’s actions on the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing
*Lee’s participation in a post-blast analysis at Abbey Gate
*The performance of the units Blackbeard supported
*What Blackbeard’s teams did on 27-28 August
*Returning to Kuwait and what Lee observed in his Marines
*Lee’s advice to leaders on talking to their teammates about situations as harrowing as HKIA
*The role mental health checks, mental health services, and other kinds of support should play in the lives of HKIA veterans
*What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune
*The influence of cell phones on operations at HKIA
*The demilitarization process
*Maneuver warfare concepts and tools used during the NEO
*Lee’s approach to leading Marines
*The command relationships at HKIA
*Serving alongside EOD techs from other countries
*The MEU’s Female Search Team
*The 2nd Recon element at HKIA
*Preserving the capacity of Blackbeard's section
*Logistical challenges during the NEO
*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the mission at HKIA
*The actions of Lee’s Marines at HKIA that make him proudest
*Lee's most challenging decision at HKIA
*Where he thinks he performed well as a leader and decision-maker and where he could have done better
*The lessons Lee took away from HKIA and how these might apply to the Marine Corps in the future in the context of FD 2030
*Lee’s thoughts on the role and value of decision games based on HKIA
*How well the Marine Corps has studied and learned from the Kabul NEO and, more generally, its experiences in Afghanistan
*Lee’s thoughts on the other Voices of HKIA podcasts
*The one thing Lee would like Marines and other service members to know about what Blackbeard's section did at HKIA
*The Operation Allies Refuge Foundation
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Erik's Social Media Links
Twitter: https://twitter.com/Erikhistorian
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/erikthehistorian
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/erikvillard/
In this episode, we discuss the following topics.
*How Erik became a military historian
*Roleplaying games as training for military historians
*Which military historians influenced Erik most
*Becoming a digital military historian
*The creation of Vietnamwarhistoryorg
*What Erik’s ideal training for future military historians would look like
*Making military history useful to operational commands
*The US Army’s History and Heritage efforts
*Those Center for Military History (CMH) projects Erik finds most rewarding
*The challenges of writing official military history
*The monograph review process at CMH
*How studying military history provides literacy in evaluating sources
*The claim that military history is under siege in US universities
*Some of the giants of Vietnam War historiography in the English-speaking world
*Historical works that Erik recommends for US small unit leaders
*Small unit military history
*Unit historians (“5X” in the US Army)
*General William Westmoreland’s strategy in Vietnam
*Friction between Army and Marine Corps commands
*The controversy of Westmoreland’s single air manager concept
*1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division units in the Battle for Hue
*The possibility of North Vietnam capitulating
*Whether or not the US lost any battles during the war
*Why the Army lost the lessons of Vietnam
*Requests for historical materials in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom
*The poor state of record keeping in US commands during the Global War on Terror
*Some of Erik’s solutions to that problem
Links
Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967 to September 1968 by Erik Villard
The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue City by Erik Villard
U.S. Army Center of Military History
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In this episode, we discuss:
*Hayden’s experiences in 2/10 before joining the 24th MEU
*Becoming a battery XO as a second lieutenant
*Easy Battery’s experiences with the 24th MEU prior to HKIA
*Initial indicators that the MEU might head to HKIA
*Easy Battery’s training and preparations for HKIA
*The challenge of knowing when to “flip the switch” of aggression and when to turn it off
*Assuming command of Easy Battery
*Hayden's understanding of the situation at HKIA before arriving
*The decision to leave the battery’s howitzers behind
*The influence of Marine Major Zach Schwartz on Hayden’s professional development
*Hayden’s first day at HKIA
*Easy Battery’s first mission
*Hayden’s initial observations of conditions at North Gate
*Turning over the battery’s positions to the 82nd Airborne
*Easy Battery’s occupation of the holding area
*The trying conditions of the holding area
*Managing 5,000 refugees with 99 Marines
*Handling riots
*The mental and emotional toll of working in the holding area
*The concept of surfaces and gaps at HKIA
*An incident involving suspected enemy artillery
*Hayden’s experiences at Abbey Gate
*Easy Company’s activities before departing HKIA
*What Hayden observed in himself and his Marines while in Kuwait
*Hayden’s advice for small unit leaders on talking about traumatic events with their Marines
*The role of mental health support for veterans
*The role of cell phones and Signal Chat at HKIA
*The role of discipline
*The role of exhaustion and the need for tough, realistic training
*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of Hayden’s time at HKIA
*Hayden’s self-assessment as a leader during the evacuation
*His lessons learned from the operation
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In this episode, we discuss:
-What drew Col Reynolds to studying history
-The value of history for the military professional
-Avoiding traps and pitfalls in studying and using history
-Studying at Oxford
-German General Ludwig Beck
-Doctrine in the German army (1914-1945)
-How the Marine Corps used history while Col Reynolds was a company-grade officer
-His time as a student at The Basic School (TBS)
-The state of the Marine Corps in the mid to late 1970s
-The decision to leave the Marine Corps and transitioning
-Col Reynold’s time in the Central Intelligence Agency
-His experiences at TBS as an individual mobilization augmentee
-How TBS had changed since his time as a student
-Tactical decision games (TDGs) and sand table exercises as intellectual revelations
-Writing good TDGs
-Col Reynold’s contest-winning article, “Turn on Your Lights!”
-Criticisms of studying and drawing from the 20th-century German military tradition
-Researching and writing Just Cause and A Skillful Show of Strength
-Serving as the officer-in-charge of Marine Corps Field History in Operation Iraqi Freedom-I
-Interviewing Marine and Coalition leaders in Iraq
-Writing Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond
-Areas where Marine forces in Iraq could have improved
-The relief of Colonel Joe Dowdy, the commander of Regimental Combat Team-1
-The turnover of Tikrit from Task Force Tripoli to the US Army’s 4th Infantry Division
-The U.S. failure to adequately prepare for Phase IV (stability) operations
-How Marine Corps historians seem less critical of Marine leaders compared to Army historians writing about Army generals
-The controversy and conversation surrounding Force Design 2030
Links
Colonel Reynold's website: https://www.nicholasreynoldsauthor.com
"Turn on Your Lights!" by Major Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, Proceedings, November 1991
Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 by Martin van Creveld
Just Cause: Marine Operations in Panama, 1988-1990 by Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR
A Skillful Show of Strength: US Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996 by Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR
U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond by Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR (Rett)
Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway's Secret Adventures, 1935-1961 by Nicholas Reynolds
Need to Know: World War II and the Rise of American Intelligence by Nicholas Reynolds
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In this episode, we discuss:
-Tanner getting assigned his squad before deploying with the 24th MEU
-What the deployment looked like before heading to HKIA
-His reaction to the news that the MEU would deploy to Kabul
-His understanding of the situation in Kabul before touching ground in HKIA
-Tanner’s first days at HKIA
-Clearing the airport of civilians
-Working with the Taliban
-Gate operations and the challenges they presented
-The role of exhaustion in operations
-Using maneuver warfare concepts and tools
-The Abbey Gate Bombing
-Tanner’s experiences between the bombing and before his unit departed HKIA
-What he observed in his fellow Marines and himself in Kuwait following the NEO
-His experience of returning to Camp Lejeune
-The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA mission
-The presence of personal cell phones and computers at HKIA
-Tanner’s appraisal of his performance at HKIA
-The supposed animosity between 1/8 and 2/1
-Tanner’s advice for Marines transitioning into civilian life
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In this episode, we discuss the following:
-Ben’s forthcoming book on modern ground combat
-The lack of definitions of the terms “character of war” and “nature of war”
-The “debate” on FD 2030
-The supposed massive changes touted in modern warfare, like drones
-Ben's research methods and case sample set
-Coding cases
-The problem with how the US military records modern cases of military operations
-The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
-Cases of armor operating independently successfully
-Learning about modern combat from the Syrian Civil War
-The claim that urban warfare is costlier than other types of warfare
-Modern amphibious operations
-How military professionals can become less ignorant of modern warfare
-How professional military education could benefit from Ben’s work
-The 3:1 ratio in military offensive operations
-The Value of detailed small unit operational accounts
-The ideal organization for conducting research like Ben’s
-The practical and ethical challenges inherent to primary source research of modern combat
-Ben’s work on the will to fight
-The uses and limits of wargames
-How Ben got into wargaming
-The Marine Corps Wargaming Center
-Open-source reporting on Ukraine
-What surprised Ben about Russian and Ukrainian combat performance
-Irregular vs. regular warfare
-Ben’s experiences as a doctoral student at King’s College London
Links
Will to Fight: Returning to the Human Fundamentals of War by Ben Connable, Michael J. McNerney, William Marcellino, Aaron B. Frank, Henry Hargrove, Marek N. Posard, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Jasen J. Castillo, James Sladden, et al.
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In this episode, we discuss:
*What an infantry battalion operations officer does
*How Jordan’s experiences at 2nd LAR, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, and 1/8 influenced how he fought the battalion prior to HKIA
*The 24th MEU's deployment prior to heading to HKIA
*The exercises done in preparation for HKIA
*The original plan to conduct the NEO
*Where Jordan thinks he could have done a better job of preparing the BLT for HKIA
*Communications challenges between the BLT and supporting units
*Leaving for HKIA
*What HKIA was like on the first day
*Jordan’s reading of the terrain around HKIA
*The organization of the joint operations center
*The fight for the airfield
*Learning the Taliban would assist with the evacuation
*Operations at the gates
*Sending rejected Afghan families back outside
*The 82nd Airborne Division at HKIA
*How 1/8 Marines used maneuver warfare concepts and tool
*Responding to the Abbey Gate bombing
*Returning to Kuwait, observations of the Marines, and coping in the aftermath
*Coming home to Camp Lejeune
*Command relationships at HKIA
*The presence and effect of cell phones and computers among 1/8 Marines at HKIA
*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the NEO
*What Jordan learned from the HKIA mission
*Using decision games as tools to prepare for a mission like HKIA
*The supposed animosity between members of 1/8 and 2/1
*The one thing Marines and other servicemembers should know about 1/8’s time at HKIA
Links
Escape from Kabul HBO Documentary
https://www.hbo.com/movies/escape-from-kabul
“U.S. Central Command Report on Fatal Afghanistan Airport Attack,” USNI News
https://news.usni.org/2022/02/08/u-s-central-command-report-on-fatal-afghanistan-airport-attack
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In this episode, we discuss:
*The experimental and intellectual predecessors of FD 2030
*The frequency of structural change in the Marine Corps
*General Neller's dislike of the term “near-peer”
*Vertical vs. horizontal structural cuts within organizations
*The removal of scout snipers from infantry battalions
*His views on the debate on Force Design 2030
*Stand-in forces
*The role of air, sea, and land access in FD 2030
*The general’s thoughts on the war in Ukraine and the future of war
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Amazon link to Richard's book: https://amzn.to/42bM9Lx
In this episode, we discuss:
*Where the idea of Soviet high commands came from
*How they were structured
*The commanders who led them
*The role and influence of commissars in the high commands
*The Soviet capture of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island
*The high commands post-World War II
*The relationship between Soviet naval forces and the high commands
*What Richard found new and surprising in his research
*What today’s military professionals can learn from studying the Soviet high commands
*Which Soviet high commander Richard would like to see a book written about
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