Afleveringen
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On July 28, 2017, D.H. was shot to death in an alley/parking lot area behind a townhouse complex in Minneapolis where D.H.’s sister and his children lived. Surveillance video evidence depicted a man in a hoodie who drew a gun, approached D.H., put the gun to the back of his head, and pulled the trigger. A number of witnesses described the shooter as a light-skinned African-American man with a gray hoodie and long hair in braids or dreadlocks, a description that matched appellant James Andre Woodard. Two of Woodard’s daughters, aged 10 and 11, identified Woodard as the shooter. The 10-year old also mentioned Woodard’s gold teeth as an identifying characteristic. In addition, an adult witness testified to talking with Woodard shortly prior to the shooting and witnessing Woodard commit the shooting.
Woodard was arrested and charged with second-degree murder, with intent-not premeditated. A grand jury then indicted him of first-degree premeditated murder. A 12-day trial was held. At the trial, Woodard sought to submit evidence that another individual who shares his general description (without the gold teeth) may have committed the murder. Specifically, Woodard sought to introduce evidence that the potential alternative perpetrator may have been angry at D.H. due to a prior shooting; that he lived near the site of the murder; and that he disappeared after the murder and no one could find him. The trial court refused to allow the evidence to be admitted, concluding that Woodard had not introduced any evidence connecting the potential alternative perpetrator to the scene of the crime. In its instructions to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that it need not consider the lesser included charge of second-degree murder if it found Woodard guilty of first-degree murder, contrary to the decision in State v. Prtine, 784 N.W.2d 303, 317 (Minn. 2010). Neither party objected to the instruction. The jury convicted Woodard on the first-degree murder charge, and he was given a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to admit appellant’s alternative-perpetrator evidence; and (2) whether the erroneous jury instruction affected appellant’s substantial rights. (Hennepin County)
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether multiple sentences for OFP violations arising from a single incident may be permitted under the multiple-victim rule. (Crow Wing County) -
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant James Martin Alger, Sr., pleaded guilty to two counts of violating an order for protection (OFP). As part of his factual basis, Alger admitted that he violated the OFP by having contact with his ex-girlfriend and their minor son. He also agreed that he would receive two sentences, which would be served consecutively. The district court imposed sentences that were consistent with the parties’ agreement. On appeal, Alger argued that the imposition of two sentences was unlawful under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2018). The court of appeals affirmed the sentences, relying on the multiple-victim rule.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether multiple sentences for OFP violations arising from a single incident may be permitted under the multiple-victim rule. (Crow Wing County) -
Zijn er afleveringen die ontbreken?
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Cindi Ali participates in the Section 8 housing choice voucher program, a federal program administered by the Scott County Community Development Agency. Ali has a developmentally disabled child and also participates in a state program known as the Consumer Directed Community Supports (CDCS) program. Her child is eligible for home and community-based services through the Developmental Disabilities waiver.
The County determined that the money that Ali receives for care that she personally provides for her child (the parent-allocated portion) must be included when calculating her household’s annual income for purposes of determining eligibility for the Section 8 program under 24 C.F.R. § 5.609 (2018). Ali challenged that determination. A hearing officer determined that the parent-allocated portion of the CDCS benefits constitutes annual income under the federal regulation for purposes of the Section 8 program. The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) excludes, for purposes of calculating a family’s Section 8 household annual income, the parent-allocated portion of the CDCS benefits. (Scott County Community Development Agency) -
In 1996, respondent James Bergman was convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault. In 2007, Bergman filed a petition to expunge his conviction. The district court found Bergman did not qualify for statutory expungement, but the court used its inherent authority and granted Bergman expungement of judicial records related to his misdemeanor domestic-assault conviction.
Starting in 2008, Bergman was granted a permit to carry a pistol (carry permit). “[A] sheriff must issue a permit” to carry “to an applicant if the person” meets certain criteria. Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2(b) (2018). One criterion is that the person “is not prohibited from possessing a firearm under . . . any federal law.” Id., subd. 2(b)(4)(ix). Federal law prohibits a person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012). However, “[a] person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2012).
In December 2017, Bergman applied to renew his carry permit. Appellant Isanti County Sheriff Christopher Caulk (“the Sheriff”) denied Bergman’s application because of his 1996 domestic-assault conviction.
Bergman filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriff to issue him a carry permit. The district court denied Bergman’s petition. A divided panel of the court of appeals reversed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Bergman’s conviction for misdemeanor domestic assault disqualifies him from obtaining a permit to carry a firearm when judicial records related to that prior conviction have been sealed but executive branch records have not been sealed. (Isanti County) -
Unless a statutory exception applies, Minn. Stat. § 259.52, subd. 8(1) (2018) bars a putative father who is not married to a child’s mother and who fails to register with the Minnesota Fathers’ Adoption Registry within 30 days after the birth of the child “from bringing or maintaining an action to assert any interest in the child during the pending adoption proceeding concerning the child.” One such statutory exception applies to a putative father who, with the mother of the child, has signed a recognition of parentage (ROP) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 257.75 (2018) that has not been revoked. See Minn. Stat. §§ 259.49, subd. 1(a)(7); 259.52, subds. 6, 8 (2018). An ROP may not be revoked after “the date of an administrative or judicial hearing relating to the child in which the revoking party is a party to the related action.” Minn. Stat. § 257.75, subd. 2.
Appellant T.G.G. (“father”) and respondent H.E.S. (“mother”) had sexual intercourse in March of 2017, and mother gave birth to a child in January of 2018. Two days after the birth, the child was placed for adoption with respondents A.F.K. and N.D.K. (“adoptive parents”). Father became aware of the birth and, 37 days after the birth, requested a paternity test. Fifty-two days after the birth the results indicated that father was the child’s biological father. Father asked mother to allow him to raise the child and to stop the adoption process, but mother refused. Sixty-eight days after the birth mother signed a voluntary recognition of parentage (ROP), which had the effect of recognizing father as the child’s biological father. On that same day father registered with the Fathers’ Adoption Registry.
Seventy days after the birth, father filed this paternity action, seeking to be adjudicated the father of the child and naming mother as a party, and sought injunctive relief prohibiting the adoption. Three days later, without the presence of any party, the district court issued an order enjoining any adoption. Meanwhile, between the 68th and 75th days, mother signed an ROP revocation form, which was received and processed by the Department of Health (as required by statute).
Father moved for summary judgment in the paternity action, and three days later, the adoptive parents filed a petition to adopt the child in Ramsey County, and moved to intervene in the paternity action and to dismiss that action under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). The district court granted the adoptive parents’ motions, dismissing the paternity action based on section 259.52, subdivision 8(1). The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues are (1) whether section 259.52, subdivision 8(1) requires dismissal of a first-filed paternity action when the putative father registers with the Fathers’ Adoption Registry before an adoption petition is filed but more than 30 days after the child’s birth; (2) whether mother’s attempted revocation of the ROP was effective when it occurred after the district court had issued a temporary order restraining the adoption proceeding; and (3) whether section 259.52, subdivision 8 violates constitutional protections of due process and equal protection as applied to the facts of this case. (Isanti County) -
In 2017, Randy Thompson was charged with first-degree driving while impaired (DWI) after a Red Lake tribal police officer at a hospital on the Red Lake Indian Reservation observed Thompson driving while impaired and took custody of him. Because Thompson is not a member of the Red Lake Band of the Chippewa Indians, the tribal police officer contacted the Beltrami County Sheriff’s Office and transferred custody of Thompson to local law enforcement authorities for criminal prosecution. Thompson filed a pretrial suppression motion arguing that his arrest by the tribal police officer was unlawful because the officer lacked any authority to arrest him for violating a Minnesota state law on the Red Lake Indian Reservation. The district court denied the suppression motion and Thompson was convicted. Although the court of appeals concluded that the tribal police officer did not qualify as a peace officer under Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 18 (2018), and there was no evidence in the record to show that the tribal police officer had concurrent jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 626.93 (2018), the court of appeals determined that the tribal police officer had inherent authority to detain Thompson and transfer custody to local law enforcement authorities for criminal prosecution. Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed Thompson’s conviction.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue is whether the tribal police officer had authority to take custody of Thompson for violating a Minnesota state law on the Red Lake Indian Reservation and transfer custody of Thompson to local law enforcement authorities for criminal prosecution. (Beltrami County) -
Appellant AIM Development (USA), LLC, purchased a former paper mill site and landfill in respondent City of Sartell in 2013. AIM’s predecessors-in-title had received permits from the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) to operate an industrial solid waste land disposal facility. The City amended its zoning ordinance in 1989, which rendered industrial, non-hazardous landfills a non-permitted use of the land. However, the landfill continued to operate as a legal nonconforming use between 1989 and 2012, collecting waste generated by the paper mill operation.
In 2014, AIM submitted an application to the MPCA, seeking authority to deposit waste generated from operations other than the paper mill into the landfill. After the City objected, AIM initiated a declaratory judgment action. The district court found that the “use of the landfill is limited to waste generated by the paper mill operation” and “the disposal of other wastes and wastes from other generators is an unpermitted expansion of the use.” The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “[a] landowner seeking to continue a prior permitted nonconforming use of property is bound by the uses allowed under the terms of the land-use permit in effect at the time of the property transfer.”
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are (1) whether the court of appeals erred when it held that AIM’s nonconforming use rights are defined by the terms of the MPCA permit in effect when AIM purchased the landfill in 2013, rather than the zoning ordinances and circumstances when the use became nonconforming in 1989; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred when it concluded that “AIM’s proposal to accept waste from other waste sources constitutes an impermissible expansion of the prior nonconforming use.” (Stearns County) -
Save Lake Calhoun filed a petition for writ of quo warranto in Ramsey County District Court, claiming that the Commissioner of Natural Resources had exceeded her statutory authority in changing the name of Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska. The district court denied the petition, concluding that Save Lake Calhoun failed to establish an ongoing act necessary to obtain quo warranto relief.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Save Lake Calhoun, concluding that the district court erred by denying the petition for writ of quo warranto because Save Lake Calhoun had presented “a sufficient claim for the ongoing exercise of power” by the Department of Natural Resources. The court of appeals also addressed the merits of the claim and determined that the Commissioner of Natural Resources lacks authority under Minn. Stat. §§ 83A.015–.07 (2018), to change a lake name that has existed for more than 40 years.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether the Legislature gave the Commissioner of Natural Resources authority to change the name of a lake that has been known by its current name for more than 40 years; (2) whether a writ of quo warranto is appropriate; and (3) whether Minnesota should abolish or limit the common-law writ of quo warranto. (Ramsey County) -
In 1992, appellant Edward Martin was convicted in California of sexual batterAppellant Ronnie Bila Shaka was charged with violating a domestic abuse no-contact order that prohibited him from having contact with his wife. When Shaka’s wife failed to appear for the jury trial, the State moved to admit her out-of-court statements to a law enforcement officer regarding Shaka’s contact with her, arguing that the statements were admissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause. In support of its motion, the State submitted recordings of telephone calls Shaka made while in jail awaiting trial. The district court granted the State’s motion and the jury found Shaka guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Shaka’s conviction.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the State established that Shaka forfeited his right to confront his wife. (Hennepin County)y. Martin eventually moved to Minnesota. In 2005, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) informed Martin that he was required to register for life as a predatory offender in Minnesota because of his California conviction. In August 2016, Martin registered with the BCA as homeless. In February 2017, respondent the State of Minnesota charged Martin with failing to register as a predatory offender between August 19, 2016, and September 28, 2016. The State alleged that Martin had failed to comply with a requirement to check in with law enforcement on a weekly basis. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a(e) (2018).
After a court trial based on stipulated evidence, the district court found Martin guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Martin’s conviction.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the State proved that Martin was required to register as a predatory offender between August 19, 2016, and September 28, 2016. (Hennepin County) -
In 1992, appellant Edward Martin was convicted in California of sexual battery. Martin eventually moved to Minnesota. In 2005, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) informed Martin that he was required to register for life as a predatory offender in Minnesota because of his California conviction. In August 2016, Martin registered with the BCA as homeless. In February 2017, respondent the State of Minnesota charged Martin with failing to register as a predatory offender between August 19, 2016, and September 28, 2016. The State alleged that Martin had failed to comply with a requirement to check in with law enforcement on a weekly basis. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a(e) (2018).
After a court trial based on stipulated evidence, the district court found Martin guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Martin’s conviction.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the State proved that Martin was required to register as a predatory offender between August 19, 2016, and September 28, 2016. (Hennepin County) -
Appellant Assata Kenneh brought an action against her former employer, Homeward Bound, Inc., which included a claim for sexual harassment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01–.44 (2018). The district court granted summary judgment to Kenneh’s employer, concluding that the conduct alleged “does not constitute pervasive, hostile conduct that changes the terms of employment and exposes an employer to liability” for a hostile work environment under the MHRA.
On appeal, Kenneh argued that the district court erred by failing to make factual inferences in her favor and applying the incorrect legal standard. Kenneh also asked the court of appeals to abandon the “severe or pervasive” standard for sexual harassment claims based on a hostile work environment. The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether Minnesota should abandon the “severe or pervasive” standard for sexual harassment claims under the MHRA; (2) alternatively, whether Kenneh experienced severe or pervasive sexual harassment; (3) whether Kenneh’s employer took sufficient remedial action such that summary judgment was proper; and (4) whether Kenneh’s employer should be subject to a heightened standard of liability under the employer’s harassment and offensive behavior policy. (Hennepin County) -
Appellants own property in Lake County between Silver Bay and Little Marais on both sides of Highway 61. The State, by its Commissioner of Transportation (MNDOT), filed a petition to condemn permanent and temporary easements over appellants’ property for improvements to Highway 61. The rights described in the petition made no explicit mention to rights of access, permanent or temporary. The district court approved the petition and appointed commissioners to determine the amount of damages sustained. The commissioners determined that the total damages should be nearly $400,000, with $305,000 being due to lost access to the property.
Both parties appealed the commissioners’ determination to the district court and moved for partial summary judgment regarding lack-of-access damages. Appellants argued that during the construction period, MNDOT had the ability to utilize the easements and completely prevent access across the easement area to the remainder of their property. Appellants also argued that they are entitled to recover for construction interferences caused by MNDOT. The district court denied appellants’ motion and granted MNDOT’s motion. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that because MNDOT did not seek and appellants did not prove a taking of their right of access, they cannot obtain damages for the right of access under any theory.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether Minnesota should adopt the “fullest extent” rule, under which damages may be based on the government’s fullest possible use of the easement; and (2) whether appellants are entitled to construction interference damages. (Lake County) -
Appellant Luis Cruz Montanez was charged with attempted second-degree murder and second-degree assault. Montanez, represented by a public defender, does not speak English and requires the assistance of a Spanish-language interpreter during court appearances. Montanez filed an ex parte application under Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (2018), requesting $2,000 for interpreter services to facilitate communication with his attorney outside of the courtroom. In support of the application, Montanez included affidavits from the chief public defender for the district and the chief administrator for the State Board of Public Defense indicating that the Ninth District Public Defender’s Office no longer had funds available to hire experts, secure transcripts, hire interpreters, or undertake other costs contemplated by Minn. Stat. § 611.21 for the remainder of 2019.
The chief judge denied the application. Montanez appealed and his criminal case proceeded in district court while the appeal of his application was pending. The Ninth District Public Defender made arrangements with an interpreter for a delayed payment following resolution of the appeal or after the start of the new fiscal year. As a result, Montanez received interpreter services when he communicated with his attorney outside of the courtroom. About a week before Montanez pleaded guilty to second-degree assault, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of his application.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) does Minn. Stat. § 611.21 require the county to pay for interpreter services needed to facilitate out of court attorney-client communication if the district public defender no longer has funds available to pay for such services; and (2) is this appeal moot. (Pennington County) -
Respondents Andrew Cilek and Minnesota Voters Alliance (collectively Alliance) brought an action claiming that the Secretary of State unlawfully refused to disclose certain voter registration data requested under the Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01–.90 (2018). The Alliance requested access to “non-private government data” contained in the Statewide Voter Registration System, but the Secretary of State refused to provide access to data that was not part of the “public information list” under Minn. Stat. § 201.091 (2018).
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Alliance. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “data on (1) registered voter status, (2) reason for a challenge, and (3) voter history are public data” under the Data Practices Act and Minn. Stat. § 201.091.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether voter registration data other than data in the “public information list” is accessible as public data. (Ramsey County) -
The Washington County District Court issued a search warrant for the home office of appellant K.M., an attorney who handles, among other matters, criminal defense cases. Officers of the Burnsville Police Department executed the warrant, seizing a number of electronic devices that contain files covering K.M.’s entire law practice. K.M. filed a motion in Dakota County District Court under Minn. Stat. § 626.04(a) (2018), asking for the return of her property, arguing that a search of an attorney’s office and seizure of attorney-client communications is unconstitutional. Following an ex parte hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding the search and seizure proper and the seized property was held in good faith as potential evidence in an uncharged matter.
K.M. filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking the return of the seized property, which the court of appeals denied in appeal No. A19-0414. The supreme court granted her petition for review, also granting the intervention motion and petition for review filed by K.M.’s clients, appellants John Does 1–4. K.M. also filed an appeal of the district court’s decision under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103 in appeal No. A19-0714. On its own motion, the supreme court granted review of appeal No. A19-0714, and ordered the two appeals consolidated. Finally, the supreme court granted the State’s intervention motion to participate in the consolidated appeals.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issues presented are: (1) whether all of K.M.’s seized property, including the seized client files, should be returned and all copies destroyed; and (2) whether further orders are justified to protect attorney-client privileged information. (Dakota County) -
In 2017, Savonte Townsend was charged with simple robbery under Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2018). An employee at a liquor store reported to law enforcement that Townsend concealed bottles of liquor in her bag and attempted to leave the store, but when she was confronted by the employee, a physical altercation ensued and Townsend relinquished the bottles of liquor. The case proceeded to a court trial and the district court found Townsend guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Townsend’s conviction, concluding that the phrase “carrying away” in the simple-robbery statute means the act of moving personal property from the location of the taking.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted the language of the simple-robbery statute. (Hennepin County) -
Appellant Amanda Grace Visser was driving a 2000 Pontiac that was owned by her mother when the driver of an underinsured truck failed to obey a stop sign. Visser claims she sustained more than $150,000 in damages in connection with the resulting accident. The insurance policy for the driver’s truck provided only $50,000 in liability coverage. Visser’s mother had insurance coverage on two vehicles through respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company: the 2000 Pontiac that Visser was driving and a 1998 Chevrolet. The Pontiac policy provided underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits with an upper limit of $100,000 per person; the Chevrolet policy provided UIM benefits with an upper limit of $250,000 per person. State Farm paid Visser $100,000 in UIM benefits under the Pontiac policy.
Visser filed this declaratory judgment action against State Farm, claiming she was entitled to additional UIM benefits under the Chevrolet policy. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to State Farm. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether Visser is entitled to additional UIM benefits under the Chevrolet policy. (Hennepin County) -
In 2016, appellant/cross-respondent James Poehler was charged with third-degree driving while impaired after a law enforcement officer conducted a traffic stop of his vehicle for a cracked windshield violation under Minn. Stat. § 169.71, subd. 1 (2018), and a seatbelt violation under Minn. Stat. § 169.686, subd. 1(a) (2018). Poehler filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his impairment, arguing the stop of his vehicle was unlawful. The district court denied the suppression motion, finding that the stop was lawful based on the cracked windshield. Poehler was convicted following a stipulated-facts court trial.
The court of appeals affirmed Poehler’s conviction. It disagreed with the district court that the officer conducted a lawful traffic stop based on a cracked windshield because there was no evidence in the record that the crack in the windshield limited or obstructed Poehler’s vision. However, the court of appeals upheld the traffic stop based on the seatbelt violation.
On appeal to the supreme court, the issue presented is whether the law enforcement officer had a lawful basis to conduct a traffic stop of Poehler’s vehicle. (Isanti County) - Laat meer zien
