Afleveringen
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In 1969, President Nixon announced the end of all American offensive biological weapons programs, and renounced the first use of chemical weapons. But it wasnât until several months later that Nixon confirmed that the U.S. would end all military research into toxins, which can be created either in nature or in the lab.
Nixon chose to end that toxin research because of one man, our interviewee today. Dr. Matthew Meselson is well-known in biology for his Meselson-Stahl experiment, which demonstrated that DNA replicates semiconservatively, and has won myriad awards for his academic work. But his consulting work for federal agencies at several crucial moments in Cold War history may be Dr. Meselsonâs greatest professional contribution.
Dr. Meselson is 94 years old. He graciously agreed to a conversation with Statecraft about one of those moments. The first part of our conversation is published below.
What Youâll Learn: How do you convince a president in one memo? How did Hungarian lunch ladies help lead to Nixon banning toxins for military use? Why did the Joint Chiefs of Staff want to develop anthrax? Why was Nixon reading Michael Crichton?
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Most Americans have never heard of the Domestic Policy Council. What is it, and why does it matter? Today, we interviewed Cecilia Muñoz, former Director of the Domestic Policy Council under President Obama.
We cover: Why did the Biden presidential transition differ sharply from the Obama transition? How do you stop bureaucrats from slow-walking policies they dislike? What decisions never make their way up to the president?
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Zijn er afleveringen die ontbreken?
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Today's interviewee, Professor Chris Snyder, is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Institute for Progress (IFP). He teaches economics at Dartmouth College, where he specializes in industrial organization and microeconomic theory. He is also a research associate at the NBER, treasurer of the Industrial Organization Society, and a faculty director for the University of Chicago's Market Shaping Accelerator.
Chris played a pivotal role in the advance market commitment, or âAMC,â for the pneumococcal vaccine, which saved close to a million lives.
What youâll learn:
How did the U.S. and Russia end up in the same funding coalition? Why didnât we design an AMC for malaria? How do you place a market value on future innovations? Why would cancer and Alzheimerâs be poor candidates for an AMC?
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Today, we talked to Laura Thomas, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer and Chief of Base in Afghanistan. She has served over 17 years in national security and leadership roles. We discuss:
00:00 How a CIA station operates
8:46 What kind of intelligence failure was October 7th?
24:39 Why did intelligence agencies predict Kabul would fall quickly to the Taliban?
30: 09 The holes in how CIA teaches tradecraft
Read the transcript at https://www.statecraft.pub/p/how-to-run-a-cia-base-in-afghanistan
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When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, hundreds of tons of nuclear materials were suddenly unsecured. The new, fragile Russian government had no ability or desire to claim facilities in formerly Soviet states, and it could no longer pay nuclear plant workers. Operatives from rogue states offered cash to purchase uranium and higher nuclear physicists.
Today we talked to Andy Weber, one of the American operatives who helped lock down dangerous nuclear material from Kazakhstan to Georgia to Moldova.
What Youâll Learn
How did the US secure dangerous nuclear materials?
Why didnât the Department of Energy want the US to acquire them?
Why shouldnât you bring bourbon to Soviet functionaries?
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.statecraft.pub