Afleveringen
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Intelligence failures, strategic surprise, heavy attrition, mass casualties, reversals, internal rivalries, personality conflicts, communications breakdowns, political posturing and big egos. Plus an enemy that out-gunned, out-numbered, out-fought (at least initially) and out-flanked the IDF in ways that had been discounted for years. The 1973 Yom Kippur War (the Fourth Arab-Israeli War) was an event that shaped the Middle East for decades afterwards but also changed the Western Way of War. Peter talks to Lt Col Nate Jennings, US Army, about wide wet crossings, multi-domain operations, reconstructing divisions under fire, hubris, and how land forces can create windows for other domains to get to the fight. If only someone had explained MDO like this before.....
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It seems useful to frame some of the discussion about warfare around norms and forms rather than the character and nature terminology: this allows for a better understanding of the continuities and changes of combat and warfare that endure rather than being more limited in time and space. It also enables us to have a more nuanced discussion about context. IAfter the release of our book last month, ‘Wars changed landscape?’, I talked to my co-author Dr Paddy Walker about our findings as well how it all came about, and whether we missed anything in retrospect.
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Zijn er afleveringen die ontbreken?
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Peter is joined by John Hemmings from the US and Malcolm Davies from Australia to talk about AUKUS. Since the security agreement was signed in September 2021, taking many people by surprise, the security situation in the Indo Pacific has deteriorated. But progress on both Pillar One and Pillar Two activities has not been rapid. Indeed, it sometimes feels like wading through treacle – despite the PR hype and political speeches. Peter, Malcolm and John try to identify the hurdles and challenges to progress and where the solutions might lie. There are also a series of warnings that lie within: It may be that if we don’t give industry a big enough role, domestic and political change in 2024 could put an end to the partnership before it delivers.
This episode is sponsored by Leidos. For more information on what Leidos do in national security and defense, go to https://www.leidos.com/company/our-business/defense
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In October 2023, an expert group of national security experts from around the world came together at Wilton Park in Sussex for a discussion and exchange of views on the role of technology in future war, and the strategies that Western states needed to adopt in order to mitigate the impacts, to improve their own credibility, and make adversaries think twice. The conference convener, Professor Julian Lindley-French joins Peter to talk through some of the findings.
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Some states face complex calculations in balancing their reactions to wars happening around them. Many (perhaps most?) governments of the day are approaching wars with less of an eye to the region and the future, and more towards domestic agendas and opinions. That is certainly the case in Europe. Importantly, decisions on foreign policy alignment are far more precarious for regional actors. For the conflict in Gazza following the terrorist atrocities conducted by Hamas in Israel in October 2023, understanding why Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey are making the decisions that they are is important. After all, perhaps it is only through their eyes that we can see who is really winning.
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We live in a guarded society. Humanity seems to have adopted fortification on the battlefield and in our homes and cities at an unusual scale. Forming an intrinsic part of positional warfare, urban combat, and modern warfare (from Iraq to Ukraine), the ideas around fortification have been long ignored by research in the national security community. Professor David Betz from King’s College, London talks to Peter about his research and latest publication highlighting the continuities of this fortification zeitgeist across human evolution. The take away is about valuing more our engineers, our CS, our CSS, and our architects. But also in thinking a little more about the values we attribute to risk mitigation. We probably need to think some more about the reasons for failures in liquid modernity too.
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Most people will not have missed the visit North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, to Russia last month. What went without comment was the significance of the realignment with Moscow and not Beijing. As the first foreign visit after three years of self-imposed pandemic national lockdown, the message was very clear: The Russia-Hermit Kingdom relationship is important. Russia needs ammunition and rockets for its on going war in Ukraine; the North Korean shopping list is more varied. It already has the diplomatic support needed at the UN and food aid continues to be delivered, so the cost to Russia is more likely to be material and knowledge based – satellite and military technologies trump that list. Nuclear demands probably are lower down since it appears that DPRK is already making preparations for its 5th test (under Kim Jung Un). What is a good response for Taiwan and the US? This was the question for Ankit Panda to ponder.
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Beijing seems to have an insatiable appetite for increasing the scale and pace of military operations around Taiwan: from embargo operations to large scale, set piece amphibious exercises, busting median line airspace agreements and live missile firings. As Ralph Cossa, president emeritus of Pacific Forum, describes it, “Xi Jinping seems to be tactically clever but strategically foolish”. The US, by comparison, continues a doctrine of strategic ambiguity over American policy. If more operational clarity is required to effectively deter China and the PLA, it would also add to the dilemma facing Beijing as it contemplates timelines for further action. In Taipei meanwhile, the reality of making the country into a ‘poisoned shrimp’ (the Asian equivalent of a porcupine strategy) is already in action on the ground.
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How do companies, businesses, and industry make investment decisions in a war zone? There is no shortage of international funding committed to the rebuilding phase of Ukraine in a post war era yet most companies simply don’t want to wait until hostilities have ended. Indeed, societies and the people can't wait that long either. So how do companies make decisions about investing into war zones? When do they make the decision and how long do they wait? How are boards influenced by politics and events on the front line? Peter is joined by Mike Longstaff, MD of the security arm of Audere Group, to explain how it all happens.
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Bringing conflict to a conclusion usually comes about because of annihilation of one party or the exhaustion of both. It sounds very 'dead Prussian', but relies more on each sides determination and resources than one might imagine. The inimitable Professor Beatrice Heuser tackles peace theory and the reality of ending wars, as well as treaties, truces and congresses. Even if peace is not, in fact, a recent invention and the reverse is true, neither that perspective nor the great history of warfare provide us with easy answers to a solution to the Russia invasion of Ukraine in a way that provides a lasting solution. Well not without another Russian revolution.
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The modern interpretation of manoeuvre theory for warfare holds the deep battle as a central avenue to success. Indeed, Western militaries have become so invested in this thinking that force designs and procurement prioritise capabilities for this over almost anything else. Yet, as Franz-Stefan Gady points out, what if our adversary is just not structured for the type of systems warfare that successful use of manoeuvre warfare necessitates? What if the deep battle doesn’t matter, or – and this be heresy to many – centres of gravity just not relevant? Have we even thought about alternative approaches, let alone started educating the next generation of the profession of arms in them? A discussion that starts to turn our theory of battle upside down.
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The opportunities to use manoeuvrist theory on contemporary battlefields are scarce, if they exist at all. Professor Tony King talks to Peter about the three conditions he believes are necessary for it to be successful (movement and scale, defining will and cohesion, and delegated command). Given the geometry, topography and telemetry of today’s battlefields we would perhaps be better off educating leaders about alternatives to manoeuvrism.
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There is a disturbing undercurrent in Western PME – demonising anything not termed ‘manoeuvre’ or ‘manoeuvrist’ as stupid, dated and irrelevant. Ukraine’s generals have been lambasted by Western counterparts on occasion for not embracing more manoeuvrism in their strategies. Yet the reality is that manoeuvre has simply become a catch-all for almost anything to do with modern combat. Not even the guidelines provided by Martin Van Creveld really help. Peter is joined by Amos Fox as they start season 3 to pull manoeuvre apart.
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Going into the NATO summit at Vilnius, NATO had a three tier membership structure and lacked the political leadership and will to make hard decisions. There are some good examples of things going well at the tactical, military end (the CDCM systems in the Baltic that make that region one with a compelling A2AD challenge for Russia, for example) but behind the veneer of platitudes and handshakes, the Alliance looks less solid. Indeed, as described by Professor Julian Lindley-French, it has become an ‘anything-but-war’ grouping of states, full of pretence and appeasement. In this discussion we cover the underlying issues with the Alliance and are left wondering whether today’s NATO leaders have the courage to get out of the Potemkin village they have sleep walked into.
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Surrounded by three potential adversaries, hampered by a history that prevents deep alliances with neighbours, and a below-optimal command integration arrangement with the US, Japan took stock and realised it needed a reset in defence and security. Peter is joined by Japan specialist Dr John Hemmings from Hawaii to talk through some of the detail and intricacies of Japan’s national security strategy, hard power spending, constitutional changes, collective warfighting capabilities in the Pacific.
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For decades, politics, security and economics in the Middle East has been inextricably linked to the USA. Today, however, Washington increasingly views the Middle East as a fly-over region – one that is largely absent from US policy. The space where America is now absent has been occupied by both China and Russia: the former having successfully negotiated a new era of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia (not an unsubstantial achievement). Peter talks to Mike Stephens about what we might have missed in the Gulf, and why – despite inherent instabilities – there is cause for hope.
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After 20 Shangri La dialogues, it is not difficult to say that the world has changed – certainly in the Indo Pacific. In 2002, scholars and global leaders were talking about the ‘Peaceful Rise’ more than the ‘China Dream’. They were wrong, but so too might the predictions of economists forecasting an economic uber-power in China that completely overshadowed the rest of the world. Yet the CCP and the PLA are not backing down. If anything, the rhetoric – and the actions – of Chinese politicians and military forces continue to raise the temperature. In this episode Peter talks to grand strategist Dr Peter Layton about what this feels like from Australia – somewhat closer to the action than London. And it’s not just about China and Taiwan: Beijing’s influence in DPRK and Pakistan complicates matters considerably. Especially when there are nuclear weapons on the table.
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The price of military equipment and people means that many militaries are having to make decisions about trade-offs between force elements. Taking a ‘capability holiday’ might not be fashionable language anymore, but it does reflect the reality – even with the significant promises in defence budgets. In France, a Euro413Bn spending promise over 5 years can’t deliver much when the price of equipment, people and a nuclear programme recapitalisation are already on the cards. It means, as explained by scholar Michael Shurkin, that the philosophy of manoeuvre, technology, a light footprint, perfect logistics and engineering, independence of thought, and French military elan remain central to French force design. Accompanied, foremost perhaps, by the interests of the French defence industrial base. In this conversation we examine the reasons why traditional European military powers adapt in the way they do (or don’t).
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The Black Sea has been called a Russian lake before. Perhaps it was again after 2008: Russia used the Black Sea for its invasion of Georgia, as a key avenue for attack during the annextion of Crimea (2014), for actions in Syria (2015 onwards), and for the latest attacks on Ukraine (starting in 2022). Yet despite a burgeoning military presence, the Black Sea is now a leading stage for competition between regional powers - not just Russia and Ukraine, but also Turkey, Georgia, Bulgaria and Romania too. Indeed, Turkey plays a really significant role both at sea and ashore, able to act as a regulator on Russian military activities at sea - but this is best done in concert with NATO and the EU. Natia Seskuria, founder and executive director of the Regional Institiute for Security Studies, talks to Peter about Russia's aspirations in the Black Sea, and is still able to "walk and chew gum" in the region. Natia talks about what sort of 'grey zone' activity Moscow continues to engage in, how effective it is, and what measures could be taken to counter Russia - if the West really wanted to.
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Poland is an outlier in Europe: a state that has been willing to resource the national security statements of political leaders made in 2022, and cognisant of observations about high intensity combat being seen in Ukraine after the latest Russian invasion. Unlike other European capitals, Warsaw has funded a recapitalisation of its military based on a philosophy that puts aside a promsied future of military nirvana, replacing it with a pragmatic approach towards the good enough. Sound contracting for specific items, mainly from the US and South Korea, has ordered an impressive list of equipment, with additional equipment being lined up - all with a keen eye on the soverign benefit of onshoring production. And the contrast to the modest plans of Germany, France or the UK is stark.
Yesterday I had the pleasure to talk to Jakub Knopp, a young researcher who has recently published an excellent article on this topic. Jakub was also cautious in his assessment of the costs of these acquisitions over the next decade. It was a pragmatic and revealing insight into the differences between Poland and their geographic neighbour, Germany.
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