Afleveringen
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The ultimatum had expired, and yet somehow, Austria had not declared war on Serbia. What was going on?
Well, despite pushing the crisis forward with reckless abandon, the Austrian chief of staff Conrad von Hotzendorff now seemed awake to the dangers facing the country. The army would not be ready for war until 12 August, he said. This was a shock to the Germans, who continued to expect a lightning Austrian strike at Belgrade. But it did give the diplomats time to do their work.
From Britain, Sir Edward Grey believed a mediation scheme involving four uninvolved powers was the answer. He encouraged Berlin to push this idea, and the Germans did so, but only reluctantly, and out of fear of offending Britain if they did not. But the question of Russia was arguably the most important of all, and the Tsar was apparently now willing to exercise his military muscle by approving the period preparatory to war, and the mobilisation of key military districts.
This should have shown Austria that Russian intervention was highly likely, yet her statesmen continued to forge ahead. They had lost the diplomatic initiative, and they had failed to present Europe with a fait accompli. Instead, the sluggish, conditional Austrian response seemed ideally suited to diplomatic mediation. But would Austria take the easy way out? Incredibly, from Vienna, the answer was still no.
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Here we address the question - now that Austria's ultimatum to Serbia had expired, and the Austrians had evacuated Belgrade, what was Russia going to do about it?
The answer is as complicated as it is controversial. Russia's response revolved around military preparations; specifically, those preparations which would make the mobilisation of its enormous army across such a vast empire easier to carry out. These measures were called the Period Preparatory to War, and on this day, these measures were officially approved by the Tsar and his Ministers. What did this mean? Was the Period Preparatory to War simply mobilisation under a different name, or was it a reasonable response to the crisis, which merely granted Russia more diplomatic leeway?
Unsurprisingly, the answer is contentious. To some, this was the key aggravating factor which transformed the July Crisis from a regional dispute into the world war it became. To others, Russia's preparations may have been inflammatory, but they were not necessarily sinister. Should we take these measures as proof of Russia's intention to orchestrate a world war on favourable terms to themselves? Perhaps we should not go so far, but one thing is certain, by the end of the day, a line had been crossed in St Petersburg.
Once more details leaked out, Austria and Germany were bound to take notice. The question then became - would the Central Powers be scared off, or would they up the ante, seeing in Russia's behaviour yet another bluff which had to be called? Could anyone stop this game of chicken? In fact the Russians were not the only actors willing to be economical with the truth. Another was the French ambassador, Paleologue, and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berchtold, as well as many German officials, determined to have their localised war and firm in the belief that Russia would back down.
In this episode, we wade through this soup of contradictions, poor communications, mistrust and misinformation, to arrive at some worrying conclusions. Whoever we might claim was responsible, Europe was entering the twilight period of peace, whether contemporaries wished to acknowledge it or not.
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Zijn er afleveringen die ontbreken?
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By now, everyone was expecting Austria-Hungary to do something once its ultimatum expired later in the day, but what? And could this response be adjusted, and peace be preserved, if only a certain diplomatic finesse was applied?
In Britain, Sir Edward Grey certainly hoped so. The solution, to him, seemed one of mediation, where the four uninvolved powers - Britain, France, Germany and Italy - gathered to arbitrate the Austro-Serb dispute. The question then became, could Germany be brought on side? Many were doubtful. It did not help that the German claim it had known nothing of the ultimatum was highly suspicious. Was it truly believable that Austria had acted entirely alone? This question informed the responses.
In Russia, Sergei Sazonov continued to lead a firmer and more assertive foreign policy, but to what end? As he learned of the British mediation plans, Sazonov did not rule them out, but he also failed to mention that Russia's preliminary military measures were already underway. It was understood that mobilisation was a dangerous risk, which would complicate mediation efforts. The further these measures had gone by the time mediation got its chance, the harder it would be to save the peace. This was why an extension of Austria's 48 hour deadline became briefly popular - this would give everyone sufficient time to act. Unsurprisingly, Vienna opposed this measure, and it scarcely got off the ground before time had run out, and Serbia handed over its reply.
Contrary to contemporary views and the opinions of historians since, the Serbian reply was not designed to placate Austria. It was instead designed to engender sympathy among the Entente. There was no defiant language or accusations, but Belgrade's response did reject core Austrian demands, and denied that they Vienna possessed sufficient evidence to prosecute its case. As the Austrians fully appreciated, the ultimatum was always designed to be unacceptable, but Serbia's 'perfumed' response, rather than a full throated message of defiance, greatly complicated the situation. Indeed, it was one among many complications of the day, as the glacial pace of Austrian policymaking encountered yet more roadblocks. All the while, in the east, Russian soldiers were marching to their destinations. If there was a chance for peace, then this was surely the last chance.
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We return to our narrative on an eventful day in world history. By the end of 24 July, Russia had established its policy towards Austria's ultimatum. But what was this policy, and why did Russia act so differently to crises in the past?
We find Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov to be central to the events that transpired next. But what did Sazonov want? He authorised the period preparatory to war, and signalled his intention to support Serbia via war, if it came to that. This did not mean Sazonov was a warmonger, but he had not been entirely honest with the Central Powers either. Moderate advice was given to Serbia, and the Austrian and German ambassadors were informed that Russia would not look lightly upon an Austrian attack. Seeing German tentacles curling around any Austrian initiative, Sazonov felt he could not back down if Russia wished to retain her prestige, but what did this mean in practice?
Further afield, Britain was perhaps the sole power capable of offering a neutral space where mediation could take place. But how attractive were Grey's proposals, and were they likely to appeal to Germany? Did British distractions with the Irish Home Rule crisis impact its effectiveness in this regard? It seemed unlikely that London could rely on France. This time around, the French, represented in St Petersburg by Paleologue, maintained that Russia would find its ally loyally by its side for whatever came next. Such assurances were not designed to pull Russia back, because the prevailing belief in Entente circles was that only a policy of firmness could deter the Central Powers from going further.
However, if all the powers clung to a policy of deterrence, and if none considered backing down, what we are left with is a dangerous game of chicken with no off ramps. Since Sazonov believed that it meant war this time, was this proof of his conspiratorial policy, or simply of his realism? Could the Central Powers have done anything to defuse the crisis, or had the assumption of Russia's retreat blinded them to the disaster they now hurtled towards? All these questions and many more will be addressed in the episodes to come, so I hope you enjoy it!
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After a crazy two months, it's time we had a chat.
In this episode we'll be talking about the Age of Bismarck Patreon series, which has been advertised for years, and requested for even longer. We finally have a release date, and I can't wait to welcome you all to Bismarck's world.
We also talk about the July Crisis series, how it's gone for me so far, and why I feel compelled to change things up. We get a bit personal, but I've never been shy about being honest with you, so thanksss for your patience and enthusiasm!
WDF is entering an exciting new phase, but we have to make sure there's a proper balance between Zack's life and Zack's pod-baby, so that we can do justice to the fascinating projects we have in store for you. See you all...soon!
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By late 1912, it appeared the period of Anglo-German detente was over. The Kaiser assembled a War Council, and apparently planned for a war of domination. In fact, appearances were deceptive, and although Britain and Germany's relationship had been damaged, it was still intact. There now emerged a new opportunity to repair it, as the Balkan Wars brought the two disinterested powers together again.
The two powers had already achieved a great deal by pushing the naval race to the side. But other questions were more difficult. Both France and Germany came to terms with the role of Belgium in their war plans, but only Germany viewed its violation as a necessity. This key aspect of German strategy was already locked in, but this proved a grave miscalculation. That said, opinions in Berlin had arrived at more optimistic conclusions by 1914. Britain, it was said, faced an internal crisis over Ireland, and those intractable problems meant opportunities for the Central Powers.
Yet still, the Anglo-German detente continued, with fascinating trends emerging in the British Foreign Office. For so long dominated by anti-German sentiment and fear of Russia, a new generation of officials were graduating to new positions, and they were less sanguine about the Anglo-Russian relationship. A last minute trip by Grey's private secretary to Berlin suggested a new era of cooperation, but this, like so many other plans, fell to pieces once the Archduke fell in Sarajevo. Here we conclude the story of this underrated relationship, and set the scene for what was to come.
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By late 1911, Germany had been embarrassed by the Second Moroccan Crisis, and the Anglo-French Entente had once again rallied. We might have expected Germany to double down on its provocative naval campaign, to increase the pressure on Britain. In fact, what happened instead was the beginning of a period of Anglo-German detente. This was initiated through the Haldane Mission of spring 1912, which sought to exchange restrictions on naval building with political guarantees.
The mission was not a success, but it did terrify the French, who worked to consolidate their agreements with Britain on the seas, with dramatic consequences. In this tug of war for Britain's friendship, though, her officials were far less free than they may have assumed. A strong current of anti-German sentiment had become entrenched in London, and it would take braver steps to reserve this trend. Could they do so, and snatch peace from the jaws of conflict? Join me here as we continue our look at Anglo-German relations on the eve of war.
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Everyone knows the story of Britain and Germany before 1914. Or at least, they think they do.
Anglo-German relations following the Russo-Japanese War seemed bound to enter a period of hostility, enabled by the naval race which forced London to invest heavily in production and innovation, and produced the dreadnought as an unforeseen consequence. But this race to outbuild the other in warship construction did not lead automatically to the events of 1914. Indeed, many possibilities existed for the two rivals to patch things up.
This was what the French truly feared, but as they prepared for a second showdown with Berlin in Morocco, the British appeared to stand by them. Was the British Cabinet entirely convinced that Germany was its enemy? Many thought so, but again, matters were not so clear cut. Even Kaiser Wilhelm's disastrous record in PR could not guarantee that these two nations, tied together by so many dynastic, religious, traditional and economic threads, would face each other on opposite sides of the battlefield.
In this first part of our trilogy looking at Anglo-German relations, we set the scene and assess some key moments when Germany became the bogeyman of Britain. Yet even as the naval race became a naval scare, and even as Britain secretly planned for an Anglo-French defence, nothing was yet set in stone. The years that immediately preceded the war were vital for the next phase in the relationship - detente.
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Austria-Hungary finally delivered its ultimatum to Serbia nearly four weeks after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.
The journey had been incredibly slow, and the outcome was nothing like the fait accompli its statesmen had originally envisioned, but Austria had officially taken the bold step towards war. What did this infamous ultimatum contain? Did it leave any possibility for Serbia to accept it with some dignity? One point in particular - the participation by Austrian officials in a Serbian investigation - was bound to be unacceptable in Belgrade. Accompanied by a 48 hour deadline, the ultimatum hit the disparate Serb government, then preparing for elections, like a bomb. All was seemingly going according to plan. Now all Austria had to do was wait for its bombshell to settle in Belgrade. As for Russia, surely the Tsar would not intervene to help regicides, right? RIGHT?!
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On 20 July, the French President, Premier, and other statesmen docked at Kronstadt, aboard the fittingly named France.
It began a tremendous spectacle of Franco-Russian cooperation, just as rumours were swirling of Austria's nefarious intentions. The allies could not know for sure what Vienna was planning, but they could send some strongly worded warnings. As the French President attempted to put steel into his allies, his Premier suffered something akin to a breakdown. Perhaps Rene Viviani was anxious about domestic politics, or perhaps the pacifist Premier was beginning to realise that a great war was more likely. Either way, once they returned to the sea, French policy would be in the hands of Maurice Paleologue, the French ambassador, and it was hard to see him as anything other than a hawk.
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As the French sailed for St Petersburg, the Austro-Hungarian government gathered in Vienna for a meeting of historic importance.
It was here on 19 July 1914 that the infamous ultimatum to Serbia was finalised, but also the question of what kind of war Austria expected to fight. Shockingly, the question of Russian intervention barely registered. The tunnel vision was laser focused on Belgrade, and now that everyone was on the same page, and the pieces in place, nothing could stop Austria-Hungary putting the finishing touches on the most fatalistic policy imaginable. Their decision to move against Serbia was by now an open secret, but amidst the rumour and whisper, the most important step yet towards war had been taken, and this was to take the whole world by surprise.
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As the French President and Premier made their way to Russia, on board the France, they tried their best to keep up to date with what was happening outsides the confines of their vessel. Troubling rumours were not hard to come by, but they could not be wholly ignored. The Central Powers kept up a front of ignorance, even luring Sazonov into a false sense of security. Here we see how the allies reacted to the suspicious news, and how close their intelligence sources came to unearthing the truth. Even though they could not quite put their finger on it, Franco-Russian solidarity was the one constant they could feel confident in.
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With the Austro-Hungarian government on the same page at long last, it remained to follow through with the ultimatum. To Berchtold, this meant moving as quickly and as secretly as possible, so that once the ultimatum arrived in Serbia, Europe would be presented with a fait accompli. The Germans were similarly anxious, and emphasised the necessity of speed.
Still, neither Berlin nor Vienna gave much thought to the Russians. Somehow, a comfortable consensus permeated: Russia would not defend Serbia, but if she did, this was the best time to fight her. The more surprised Russia was, the more likely she was to be overtaken by events. Thanks to Berchtold's carelessness and cracked Italian codes, however, the secret did leak out. Here we examine how this happened, and what it meant for the deteriorating situation.
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In our final episode looking at the Entente, we bring our story up to the eve of the July Crisis.
How had past lessons influenced the way Russia and France interpreted the world by spring 1914? Was war certain? Had new military reforms so affected the balance of power that war was now inevitable? What did the position of Britain mean for the two allies, and why was London so concerned with losing Russia as a friend? Was Germany's effort to match its rivals really sustainable in the long term?
The British strategy of balancing between the two blocs was coming to an end, but how would the Germans react to news that Russia was now courting Britain into the Entente? Was Britain truly as free as she imagined, or was the cold reality of the bloc system about to dawn in London? Still, few contemporaries believed war would come - had the peacemakers not saved Europe from war in the past? Perhaps they had, but there was no guarantee that a spark in a sensitive region would not transform the situation.
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In our second installment of this Entente analysis, we look at the Liman von Sanders crisis.
By late 1913, a new crisis in Russo-German relations centred on the status of General Liman von Sanders, appointed to command the 1st Army Corps at Constantinople. To the Germans, this was a useful way to assert their influence in the Ottoman Empire and rebuild its capabilities after several years of conflict. But to Russia, the appearance of their rival in a theatre earmarked as a sphere of Russian interest seemed akin to a threat.
How would Sergei Sazonov react, and did the resolution of the crisis settle differences, or merely establish resentments and mistrust which reverberated right up to the outbreak of the First World War? Please join us, as we examine this forgotten crisis, assess the growing military power of Russia, its relationship with France, and the possibility that Britain might tie itself more securely to its former rivals. The Entente had come a long way, yet it was far from set in stone...
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In this first of three episodes, we look at the pre-war position of the Entente!
Before we bring our narrative further, it would be useful to turn our attention to what came before. The Franco-Russian alliance was formed in 1894, and over the next twenty years, the two allies experienced their share of ups and downs. Even as new crises shifted the balance of power, France and Russia stuck together. Russia brought the manpower, and France brought the money and expertise which could project that power.
By 1912, certain limits had been set on the alliance, depending on the theatre in question, but Raymond Poincare, Premier and then President of France before the war, worked to remove these breaks, and enhance the alliance. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov distinguished himself. After several ignominious retreats on the world stage, both partners were looking for opportunities to stand firm, and show the Triple Alliance they meant business. The inclusion of Britain might affirm the supremacy of the Entente, but first, Russia would have to secure its influence in the Straits.
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As Belgrade burned with rage following the death of Ambassador Hartwig, Berchtold was on the verge of his greatest triumph.
After several intense weeks of pressure, Stefan Tisza seemed finally to be seeing the light. A combination of factors, including German pressure, agitation from his subordinates, fear of Romania, outrage at Serbia, and probably exhaustion, all moved Tisza to accept a policy of war. Tisza was eager to clarify that this did not render him a hawk - he still wished for peace if this was possible. Yet, he no longer blocked the construction of an ultimatum designed to be impossible for Serbia to accept, and he no longer flew the lonely flag for diplomacy. How had Tisza been persuaded, and what did it mean for Berchtold, to finally have a united Cabinet behind him? Here we consider these critical questions, in a pivotal turning point of the July Crisis.
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Now that German support had been acquired, and the delivery of an ultimatum to Serbia was virtually guaranteed, Berchtold had one final mission - to persuade the Hungarian Premier Stefan Tisza of the necessity of war.
This was easier said than done, since Tisza had good reasons for resisting calls for a war which he believed was unnecessary and dangerous. But Berchtold was fortunate in that the Hungarian was in the minority - Tisza was the only senior Habsburg official to press for a diplomatic resolution to the assassination, and he knew he was alone in this. The pressure was bound to increase on him to make the 'right' decision, but just over the border in Serbia, a shocking incident momentarily jolted Berchtold away from his mission.
Nikolai Hartwig, Russian ambassador to Belgrade since 1909, arrived at the Austrian embassy in Belgrade to finally pay his respects. The date was 10 July 1914, and Hartwig was there to counter several unflattering rumours regarding his reaction to the assassination. Hartwig was also keenly interested in any news of Austria's intentions towards Serbia. It had now been a fortnight since the assassination, and surely Vienna did not intend to do nothing. But Hartwig never learned these secrets, because he dropped dead of a massive heart attack just as he and his Austrian colleague were getting down to business. Although what followed contained no shortage of farce and conspiracy, Hartwig's death was yet another red flag, and to Berchtold, it furnished yet more proof that Austria would never be safe so long as Serbia went unpunished.
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By 7 July 1914, Austria-Hungary's leading officials gathered in Vienna. The key item on the agenda was what to do about Serbia, but an unspoken item amounted to what to do about Hungary.
With German support for the punitive strike on Serbia now assured, all that remained was for the Habsburg government to maintain a degree of unity at such a crucial moment in its history. Yet, unfortunately for Berchtold, Stefan Tisza - the Hungarian Minister President or Premier - refused to give his approval for the kind of aggressive policy most in Vienna now wanted. Tisza feared the acquisition of more Slavic territories, which would dilute the Hungarian influence, but he was also fearful of Russian intervention on Serbia's side, and Romanian intrusions into Transylvania.
The solution, as Berchtold understood it, was to up the ante. Pressure would be heavily applied on the Hungarian holdout, and an impression of firmness would be presented to the German ally. After many years second guessing her ally, Germany had now signalled its willingness to support Austria regardless of the complications, and this gift could not be squandered. Yet still, Tisza's position was not irrational, and it was at least possible that the Hungarian could have an outsized impact on Austrian policy.
Indeed, as we will see, Stefan Tisza was instrumental in delaying the Austrian response, removing its element of surprise, and increasing the risks surrounding it. Berchtold could not change the 1867 Compromise which granted Hungary such powers, but he could use his contacts to wear Tisza down, and make him more amenable to a swift, firm response. Whether this was war, or diplomatic triumph, or whether an ultimatum should be sent at all, were matters which were still to be hammered out.
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With the blank cheque secured, Austria had received its ally's blessing to pursue a punitive strike against Serbia - what would happen next?
The morass of questions surrounding this development deserve greater examination, but you may be wondering, just how widespread was the pro-war party in Vienna? How many officials believed that only war with Serbia could fix the Empire's chronic problems, and why did they take this position considering the risks involved? In this episode we are introduced to a memorandum published on 6 July by Berthold Molden, a senior Habsburg author, philosopher and politician in the Austrian press office. If you've ever wanted to hear from an official contemporary source outside of the traditional coterie of conspirators, which historians have paid scant attention to in the past, then this episode is for you. Expect fascinating insights into Austria's psyche, damning indictments of Austria's position, and heavy condemnation of Serbia, Russia, and any other power who stood in Austria's way.
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