Afgespeeld
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Sit Rep PTO late December 1941-January 1942
Japanese are on the offensive everywherePhilippines are already on the way outWake Island, despite a gallant defense by the Marines has been captured and the planned relief had been called off December 22.The fact that Wake Island had been abandoned by Admiral Pye lit a fire under Nimitz to strike back.Morale was extremely low in the fleet due to the fact that Wake had been abandoned. Capt McMorris, Pye’s Chief of staff, said that retreating from Wake would be “unduly cautious” and a retreat would “destroy service and public confidence. It is an opportunity unlikely to come again soon. We are in great need of a victory.”Talk about the effect of Pye’s retreat order on the Carrier ForceAubrey Fitch withdrew to his cabin so he would not hear the mutinous talk on the bridge.Fliers on Saratoga threatened to ignore the order and launch anyway.Intel officer Edwin Layton said, “To lose to an enemy that fought you and you fought well was one thing. But to lose because your own Admiral was a nervous Nellie was another.” January 1942 was probably the worst month of the war in the Pacific as far as public knowledge and morale went.Admiral King wants to strike backIn a cable dated January 2, 1942 King told Nimitz that he was not pleased with the “half-hearted” deployment of the CVs.He desired “Hit and Run” raids in the Marshalls and Gilberts.Talk about surprise raids to hit the outlying Japanese bases.Even though King wants to strike back, Nimitz’s advisers say don’t do itWhat can Nimitz strike back with?Talk about the carriers and their availabilityCV experience or lack thereofWhat are the risks of utilizing the CVs at this juncture?Who is expressing doubt?Admiral Bloch 14th Naval District responsible for defending HawaiiWhat were the arguments against a raid or raids?Bloch said that deploying the CVs on raids would leave Hawai’i dangerously exposed to further Jap assaults or invasionIntelligence on the Marshalls and Gilberts was scarceLittle was known about the targetsDidn’t think it was worth the riskWhy take the risk?CVs were all we hadWhy raid in the first place and why the outer ring?Morale boostJapan focused on going south. – this would hit them in their “rear area”“Turning Movement” not the same as flank attackPossibly may divert Japanese attention from Australia and the Coral SeaHitting the outer ring of islands was easier as there would be less of a threat from heavy Jap fleet unitsWould also protect Samoa and Australia by weakening the Jap airfields thereThe Marshall and Gilbert Islands RaidNimitz confers with Admiral Halsey about the upcoming strike.Halsey is enthusiastic (no surprise here)Says that CVs should strike like General Nathan Bedford Forrest said about cavalry, “get to the other fellow first with everything you have and as fast as you can and dump it on him.”Halsey says he will take Enterprise to the Marshalls himselfWhat strike isn’t with risk?Halsey says it’s important for the Navy’s self-respectNimitz pulls the triggerCryptanalysts state to Nimitz that radio traffic indicated a large Japanese fleet movement south, thereby putting the proposed targets out of range of major enemy fleet unitsSet for Feb 1Will comprise Task Force 8 built around Halsey and CV6 and TF 17 under Fletcher and CV5. TF8 will strike the Marshalls in the am and if possible strike again that afternoon with targets on Kwajalein, Wotje and Taroa (Moelap)TF17 will strike the Gilberts area with targets on Mili, Makin and JaluitTask Force 8Due to radio intercepts, Nimitz ordered Halsey to strike deep into the Marshalls at Kwajalein and hit the targets as much and as often as practical.Halsey told his pilots on CV6 that they would stay all day and “raise a little hell in the Marshalls”. Pilots were elatedFirst combat for Halsey & SpruanceWeather was clear, moon was high, no wind, no rain…perfect for flyingAircrews awakened at 0300Takeoff at 0445CV6 launches 37 SBDs and 9 TBDs armed with bombsVS6 to attack airfieldVB6 to freelance and attack targets of opportunityAs VS6 approached Roi island, Japs scramble fighters, Type 96 Claudes and AAA starts sprouting up as the SBDs go into their glide bombing runsVS6 CO Halstead Hopping’s SBD is jumped by Claudes and is hit by AAA. He drives directly into the drink.Emergence of Earl Gallaher and Dusty Kleiss. Wade McCluskey & Dick BestJohn Snowden gets an aerial kill on the Claude that shot down HoppingVS6 makes secondary runs on targets on the island with good successVB6They were held up and told to attack any shipping in the areaAttacked several ships, mostly cargo ships and hit several of them, including a minelayer.Second attack of VS6They gain altitude and circle to come around on the shipping initially hit by VB6Instead of glide bombing as they did on the airfield, the scouts come in high and dive in 70-degree dives on the shippingDusty drops his 500 pounder on a large vessel thought to be a cruiserDrills the cruiser dead center (the beginnings of an Dauntless dive-bomber deadeye)Roars across Kwajalein strafing the airfield as he goes, Snowden blasting away from the rear cockpitOther aircraft hit many of the ships in the harbor including a sub tender and a subVT6 attacksFirst TBD attack of the war, some successHarbinger of things to comeSecond attack of EAGBig E only 95 miles from Taroa, left her exposed to retaliatory strikes from JapsThe attack on Taroa was hotly contested by Japanese fighters and AAAVery heavy AAA, although not accurate and fighters who were all over the SBDsHalsey launches a 3rd attackThird attack is met by more Japanese fighters, many of the SBDs get shot up.Dusty Kleiss scores a hit on a hangar and is jumped by fighters on his way out.SBD gets shot up but he manages to force the fighters to disengageStands up in his cockpit to wipe the oil from his windscreen. SBD leaking fuel from his wing tanks.4th attackWotje is hit by EAG SBDs and TBDsHit a ship in the harbor and other installationsHalsey advised to “Get the hell out of here”As CV6 is pulling away at flank speed she is attacked by Japanese Nell level bombersBig E’s AAA guns start to bark at the incoming bombersCAP engaged but made no discernable impactJaps release ordnance from around 3000 feet and Captain George Murray handles the Big E like a speedboat, expertly dodging the incoming ordnanceOne last Nell, damaged by Enterprise AAA, turns around and heads back towards the ship. Pilot Lieutenant Kazuo Nakai intends on crashing his Nell into the Big E.Bruno GaidoBomber cuts the tail off of Gaido’s SBD as it falls into the seaCombat Results1 sunken transport, the Bordeaux MaruAuxiliary sub chaser No 2 Shonan Maru sinkingSub I-23 damagedSub tender Yasukuni Maru damaged5 other ships damaged to varying degrees5 SBDs lost and 2 F4FsPsychological ResultsAdmiral Ugaki furious “we’re worse than the Americans—they didn’t have warning we did”. Made us look ridiculous.Yamamoto: “They have come after us after all”. (We were supposed to negotiate a peace.)Historians downplay significance. Reinforce their forces everywhereMorale within the fleet skyrockets…finally a tangible retaliation to Pearl Harbor.Dawn February 5, Enterprise and Task Force 8 enter Pearl harbor to a hero’s welcomeHalsey had Enterprise’s crew man their battle stations in whitesBig E pulls into Pearl flying her battle colorsHorns blowing, sailors waving, bands playingNimitz comes aboard CV6 via bosun’s chair and congratulates Halsey, who breaks down in tears.The man truly loved his ship, his crew and his NavyThe actual results of the Feb 1 raid were not much in terms of actual damage, but the pysch results were undeniable.True battle tested pilots in EAGJapanese ResultsUgaki, Yammamoto’s Chief of Staff says, “They have come after all.”Forces Shokaku and Zuikaku to detach from Kido Butai and patrol Japanese home island waters for fear of a strike on the home land.Japanese move bombers closer to the outlying islandsDiverted Japanese strengthPlanted the seeds for Yamamoto’s Midway operationOther RaidsWhile EAG hits the Marshalls on Feb 1, CV5 and Task Force 17 hit Jaluit in the Gilberts the same day.Feb 24 EAG hits WakeMarch 4 EAG hits MarcusMarch 10 TF 17 hits Lae and SalamauWrap upOverall importance -
As you know, the nation is going through a process of reviewing Confederate leaders through a clearer lens, clearing away the mythology around them that emerged to justify their actions after the end of the Civil War. I see this as right and appropriate.
But I also think it’s time to contemplate General MacArthur through a clearer lens. And if we do this, we realize:
He was an unabashed liar, regularly committing what we would refer at Annapolis as honor violations of the type that would have gotten any other military officer fired.He was a narcissist of the degree to which made George Patton look like a humble man.He was self-delusional about his military prowess, believing that he and he alone had the ability to win this war in a largely naval theater, when in fact his actions likely extended it.He was a known pedophile who at the age of 50 took in a 16-year-old girl as his live-in concubineAs Army Chief of Staff he used Army mounted cavalry and tanks against protesting World War I veterans in an event referred to as the Bonus March demonstrations.In my view, rather than being a military genius, for his part in the execution of questionable campaigns that contributed to the deaths of thousands of Americans, I see him as the worst American general since another General Mac— George McClellan. About the only good thing I can say about him is he performed admirably in World War I when he far less responsibility and in his leadership of occupied Japan.A lot of this is going to sound like 20-20 hindsight, but in the military we have this thing called the After Action Report or AAR that is 100% 20-20 hindsight. The whole purpose of the AAR is to overcome the fog of war and look back on what really happened so that we can learn from it.
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-Historians often cite Japanese expansionism, imperialism, what have you, for their desire to attack Pearl Harbor. Others say it the United States’ embargos that led to the attack. Which was it? And could there have been another alternative to Kido Butai flinging airplanes at the sleeping American Pacific fleet?
-There were many warnings about the impending attack before the first aircraft dropped their ordnance. What were some of those warnings? What, if any, actions could of/should have been taken?
-After the attack, the US government needed scapegoats. They had to pin the blame on their overall intelligence failure on anybody but themselves, and so they harpooned both Army General Walter Short, and Navy Admiral Husband Kimmel. Who were these guys, what were their respective roles and were they actually to blame for the entire attack? Were they to blame for anything? What should they have done prior to the attack? Were they aware of any real threat?
-The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a military feat in its own right. Who was the planner? Why was attacking PH such a risk militarily?
-Let’s talk about the opposing forces…Japanese planning, skill and execution versus American response…
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